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Balancing the Process of Democratization
and the Continuation of State Stability
The Case of Mexico
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Elise Hope Dunn

1

ABSTRACT

Through an empirical analysis of the state of Mexico, this thesis examines the
transition to democracy from a previously consolidated, stable authoritarian system in
order to make conclusions regarding the challenges inherent in such a transition for the
maintenance of stability. Previously, Mexico was ruled under the hegemonic party, the
Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) from 1929-2000.
This research finds that the PRI’s hegemonic structure relied on unsustainable
corporatist institutions that were built, not to strengthen the state, but rather to
strengthen the party; as such, Mexico’s nascent democracy is left vulnerable with
ineffective institutions with which to deal with crises such as the current war on cartel
eradication.
Furthermore, the state that the PRI’s hegemonic system had created has ceased to
exist and with it the stability of the state and the legitimacy of its institutions. The
importance of establishing legitimacy in the electoral institutions of a state entering
democracy has been overemphasized within literature on transitions to democracy and it
has done so at the expense of state stability.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Within the Western world, the process of democratization is generally recognized
as a necessary step in the trajectory of all sovereign states. The persistence of nondemocratic regimes and the failures of many nascent democracies throughout the nonWestern regions of the world force us to question this assumption. Mexico’s current
burgeoning drug war and the challenge to state security that has arisen since its longdelayed transition to democracy nearly twelve years ago, combined with a sustained
legacy of 70 years of autocratic rule, present analysts with a unique chance to revisit the
logic behind the aforementioned assumption.
Since the early part of the twentieth century, Mexico has not experienced a single
military coup. But Mexico has not been governed by a democratic political system during
much of that period. Instead, the non-democratic Partido Revolucionario Institucional
(PRI) acted as the sole ruling party until the year 2000. The presidential election of
opposition leader Vincente Fox represented the culmination of important democratic
reforms undertaken by the PRI, but it also signified a breakdown of the institutionalized
stability obtained by the PRI regime.
Since 2000, the Mexican state has faced greater difficulty in maintaining a stable
state, despite the democratic reforms.1 The precipitate decrease in stability has come
largely as a result of the rising security crisis involving the increase in drug cartel
violence. Such a decrease in stability does not correspond to the general assumption that

Friedman, George. “Mexico: On the way to a Failed State?” STRATFOR (2008): Web.
13 Apr 2011.
1
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democracy will necessarily support the consolidation of state institutions and help further
stabilize the state. This thesis seeks to identify the core issues as to how the movement
towards open, participatory democracies affects previously established state stability. I
use Mexico’s entrance to the new millennium as a politically and economically open
democratic system and the the decrease in state security as a result of the increase in drug
cartel violence, as a case study on the challenges inherent in transitions to democracy. I
argue that the case of Mexico shows that transitions from a hegemonic one-party system
where state institutions are built under non-democratic regimes often lose relevance and
effectiveness in the process of transitioning to competitive, democratic systems.
This thesis will seek to fill a gap in knowledge that currently exists within
academic research on Mexican politics. In Latin American area studies works, as well as
in contemporary popular media, there is discussion of the possibility of Mexico becoming
a failed state.2 This discussion is often presented through the lens of the international
drug trade and its relationship to drug smuggling, especially to and from the U.S. Within
political science literature on the region, there is a separate and significant body of
literature on the evolution of the fall of the PRI and its causes. However there has been
little literature exploring the connection between these two consecutive phenomena
depicting Mexico’s transition to democracy to the accompaniment of a decrease in state
security. Furthermore, Mexico’s challenges of its post-transition democracy to state
legitimacy will serve to further inform the debate surrounding the best strategy for
implementing a smooth, stable transition.3

2

Friedman.
Diamond, Larry. "The Democratic Rollback." Foreign Affairs. 87.2 (2008): n. page.
Web. 2 May. 2012.
3
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Mexico’s experience in the past 25 years demonstrates that development and
modernization can sometimes have destabilizing results.4 The decade of the 1990s saw
two interrelated events that helped destabilize Mexico. In 1995, the negotiation and
implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) ignited intense
debate within the country over issues related to the agreement, ranging from U.S.
economic hegemony in the region to ongoing socioeconomic inequality within Mexico.
In response to the establishment of this trade agreement, a violent uprising sprang up in
the state of Chiapas.5 The continued hegemony of the PRI at this time served to pressure
the Party and mobilize the opposition to an unprecedented level by the end of the decade.
While the specific destabilizing events of 1995 have simmered down, the
underlying pressures of modernization and development remain central to the challenges
facing the country today. As noted in a recent article on the subject of immigration to the
U.S., Mexican migration has slowed to a ‘trickle,’ reportedly in part as a result of the
broadening economic opportunities within Mexico’s borders.6
Though such reports reflect the positive effect that political and economic
progress in Mexico has had on the legitimacy of the Mexican state, reports concerning
the escalation of violence and the effect it is having on Mexicans at large reveal a
conflicting picture. President Felipe Calderon came to office in 2006 making an
unprecedented declaration of war with the aim of eradicating the drug cartels. In the final
year of his sexenio, the war on the drug cartels is regarded today as a near complete
4

Schulz, Donald, and Edward Williams. Mexico Faces the 21st Century. Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1995. 189. Print.
5
Camp, Roderic. Politics in Mexico: The Democratic Consolidation. 5th ed. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2007. 26-7 Print.
6
Cave, Damien. "Better Lives for Mexicans Cut the Allure of Going North." New York
Times. N.p., 06 Jun 2011. Web. 24 Apr 2012.
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failure, with the death count amounting to between 34,000 and 47,000 since 2006 and
few discernable victories on the part of the state.7 Recent news on Mexico has
highlighted a growing number of Mexicans moving to the United States as refuge from
the violence. These recent immigrants to southern U.S. states highlight a new dichotomy
between the desire of Mexicans to commit to the new democratic system in Mexico and
the violence of the escalating drug war that has begun to prevent its citizens from
remaining in the country.8
The opposition victory of the millennial year 2000 was acclaimed as a successful
transition to a democratic system and was remarkable, not only that it happened, but also
that it was nonviolent.

This apparent transformation of a hegemonic party system into a

“democratic” system seemed to support the most basic tenants of the Liberal paradigm,
that economic progress and general modernization provide the groundwork upon which, a
non-democratic state will necessarily transition to a consolidated democratic system—a
system that will impart stability and new legitimacy to the state. But the increasing
violence, and inability of the democratically elected administrations to produce effective
results for Mexican human and state security in the face of illegal drug trafficking, and
the violence surrounding it, belies those theories.
There has been a resurgence of PRI support for nearly 12 years following the
supposed establishment of democracy in 2000. In fact, the current head of the Federal
District, a member of the PRI, has long been pegged as the favored candidate for the

7

Rawlins, Aimee. "Mexico's Drug War." Backgrounder. Council on Foreign Relations,
13 Dec 2011. Web. 24 Apr 2012.; Yost, Pete. "U.S.: Mexico seized 68,000 guns from the
U.S. since 2006." Atlanta Journal Constitution. N.p., 26 Apr 2012. Web. 29 Apr 2012.
8

Aguilar, Julian. "Forced North by Mexican Drug Wars, but United in Exile."
New York Times, 12 April 2012. Web. 15 Apr 2012.
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upcoming elections.9 The resurgent strength of the PRI further represents a reality in
contrast to these assumptions about the consolidation of democracy and the legitimacy
and stability that such a transition should guarantee.

This thesis analyzes why the PRI, which had for so long delayed Mexico’s
transition toward democracy, finally rationalized the institutionalization of a competitive
system. Mexico’s transition to an electorally competitive democracy nearly twelve years
ago was the result of over twenty years of institutional reforms regarding both the
electoral process and the organization of opposition parties in Mexico. The transition was
a direct result of strategic policy choices of the once hegemonic party.
Through an empirical examination of the transition and evolution of the Mexican
state, this thesis attempts to contribute to literature on state and democracy consolidation
through a detailed analysis of the case study of Mexico. In Chapter 2 I present literature
on the many concepts related to the stability-representation tradeoff. I present the
literature on state creation and consolidation and the indicators for weak, strong and
failed states. These indicators provide a guideline within which to categorize the relative
strength and stability of the Mexican state in the course of its evolution. I then outline
literature on state stability, state legitimacy and the crucial functions party systems and
opposition in the development of democracy followed by a conceptualization of
democracy.
Chapter 3 presents the case study of Mexico. The chapter begins by presenting the
legacies of pre-colonial and colonial society and the impact those experiences would have
9

"Mexico's Pena Nieto extends lead over main rival." Reuters Canada, 15 Apr 2012.
Web. 16 Apr 2012.
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on the new state. I present the various challenges and tensions that existed in the period
immediately following independence and how those factors contributed to the
establishment of Mexico’s longest authoritarian rule known as Porfirato. After
extrapolating on the various causes and implications of Mexico’s Revolution, the creation
of the hegemonic party system of the PRI, and the slow decline of that system, I explain
the current condition of the Mexican state today following its transition to democracy in
2000.
Finally in Chapter 4 I bring together the literature and case study presented in an
analysis of the development of the Mexican state. I begin with my own analysis on the
core experiences that contributed to the creation of the unique PRI system, followed by
the reasons behind the strength and longevity of the PRI machine and an explanation of
the long decline of the PRI and its transition to democracy. I then present my findings on
how the case of Mexico informs the discussion on the challenge of maintaining state
stability in transitions to democracy. I explain how one-party systems can affect the
stability-development tradeoff and how party systems and transitions to democracy as a
whole can impact the tradeoff.
I guide my analysis of the case study with the following questions:
1. What characteristics of the PRI state structure created such a stable and
‘legitimized’ regime and what happened to the state following the fall of the PRI
machine?
2. What changed between the mid 1960s and 1996 to bring about Mexico’s delayed
transition to democracy?
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3. If political legitimacy has diminished within the Mexican state since the fall of the
PRI, why has it diminished?
4. What has been the relationship between these two factors (1) the decrease in state
security as a result of the increase in drug cartel violence, and (2) the entrance of
Mexico to the new millennium as a politically and economically open democratic
system?
5. Do the security challenges, which have arisen since the first democratically
elected opposition candidate in 2000, signify evidence that transitions to
democracy necessarily result or often result in a decrease in state stability and rise
of state vulnerability?
I guide my conclusions as to how the case of Mexico informs literature on state
development and transitions to democracy with the following questions:

1. What is the particular effect of hegemonic one-party systems on these issues of
stability and democratization?
2. What effects can political parties and party systems have on state development
and state stability?
3. What is the significance of this phenomenon within comparative studies of
transition to democracy literature?
4. Are there certain conditions within sectors of society, the regime, the method of
the transition, the electoral process, the opposition etc. that could serve as a
warning of the possibility of state failure or instability?

11

In regard to the paradox of Mexico’s transition to democracy and the
corresponding fall of state stability, I conclude that it was the state system and the
institutions that had made the PRI so strong that ended up creating instability once the
state was opened up to opposition party leadership. The PRI’s corporatist structure relied
on unsustainable corporatist institutions that were built not to strengthen the state but
rather to strengthen the party. The state that the PRI’s hegemonic system had created has
ceased to exist, and with it the stability of the state and the legitimacy of its institutions.
I find that the legitimacy of the PRI was maintained due to (1) the assurance of
minimal public services, (2) relatively dependable economic progress and (3) the
effectiveness by which their policies were implemented and disputes were adjudicated—
however outside the realm of democratic norms the implementation was carried out.
Today, the Mexican state faces a legitimacy crisis by which it has failed to continue to
effectively create and implement policies assuring the human and state security. This has
been due to the fact that Mexico’s transition to democracy was fundamentally
incomplete, lacking the broad structural transformations necessary of a complete
transition from hegemonic party rule to a competitive democracy.
The importance of establishing legitimacy in the electoral institutions of a state
entering democracy has been overemphasized within literature on transitions to
democracy and it has done so at the expense of state stability. As will become clear in the
analysis of the case of Mexico and its transition from a hegemonic one-party system,
state institutions built under non-democratic regimes often lose relevance and
effectiveness, and with those, legitimacy, in the self-directed top-down transitions from
hegemonic to competitive party systems. It is often the most stabilizing state institutions

12

– those that implement the deliverance of key public goods to society – that breakdown
during the transition thereby weakening the strength of the state and placing the nascent
democracy in a compromising, vulnerable position.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
This section seeks first to review the current theories on state building, state
strength and state stability with the goal of understanding the particular way in which
Mexico grew in strength as a “state.” Next I will present the various permutations of
limits on states’ strength and stability depicted within scholarly literature and the debate
on the impact and precise definition of state legitimacy. I will then present useful
definition of democracy for my purposes.

State building, State Strength and Stability
State formation is a highly complex process and the result of innumerable causal
factors hence it is useful to break down the process in order to understand its evolution.
Stein Rokkan presents such conceptualization in “Dimensions of State Formation.”
Rokkan describes the process of state development in four distinct processes.
These processes fall within four channels: the military, legal, cultural and economic
channels of society.1 In the legal channel he lists the establishment of regular institutions
and rules for the settlement of disputes. The military channel involves the growth of a
militarily powerful center of physical control over peripheries. The third channel is the
process of culture, which, in the case of European state formation, involved the
differentiation of religious orders and the growth of world religions rather than localized
religion. The fourth channel involves the differentiation of technical skills and
specialization of crafts, eventually industries, within the economic channel.
1

Rokkan, Stein. State Formation, Nation-Building, and Mass Politics in Europe. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1999. 565. Print.
14

In the struggle for consolidation of a young state, the creation of a center or core
is an essential ingredient in jump-starting statehood development.2 It becomes the
responsibility of this “central core” to connect and consolidate the periphery or outlying
regions with the actors of influence from the core. Four indicators—cities, landholding
structures, churches and linguistic elites – all contribute to the relative connectedness of
center-periphery integration, which in turn involve the four channels discussed above.3
From the four channels -- military, legal, cultural and economic -- and four
indicators cities -- landholding structures, churches and linguistic elites -- come the most
useful categorization: Rokkan’s four phases of the state-building process. The first phase
is characterized by political, economic and cultural unification at the elite level.
Completion of this phase, known as the “penetration” phase, is the point at which the
central administrative machineries have penetrated the periphery through the striking of
bargains, establishment of bonds across the four channels of networks, and a few
institutions are created for the extraction (usually by taxation) of resources for common
defense, order and protection of rights.4
The second phase, the “standardization phase” of state formation, includes the
incorporation of more sectors of society into the system. The institutions built in the
standardization phase in Europe include armies, compulsory schools, and mass media
outlets. All these help generate feelings of identity.5 The role of the military, as well as
the education system and the media varied depending on the particular type of regime
that was initially created.
2

Ibid.
Rokkan 568.
4
Rokkan 572-573.
5
Rokkan 572.
3
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Phase III, or the “participation” phase, incorporates the greater mass of the
population through active participation in the political system. The institutions of the
participation phase include the mobilization and organization of political parties for
representation, and the formation of opposition outlets.6 Greater participation is often
associated with a transition towards democratic rule.
Phase IV involves the creation of agencies of redistribution. In Europe this
represented the development of the social entitlements. Phase IV represents Rokkan’s
acknowledgment and ascription to the economic development theory that unequal
distribution of wealth often, or even necessarily, characterizes the development and
growth of the economy of a state. Rokkan also suggests for latecomers to state
development, the amount of time spent in each phase correlates with the relative
difficulties and challenges faced in the successful completion of each phase – longer is
better – a shorter phase means a rockier succeeding phase. Rokkan suggests that latecomers to state formation are faced with more challenges in each phase due to the
minimum time left to build up their institutions before they were faced with “disruptive
pressures from outside as well as from inside.”7

Defining and Categorizing the State
In considering state consolidation and the development of strong, stable and
democratic states, it is important to identify a working definition of a “state.” Charles
Tilly offered the notion of the state as an organization which controls the population
within its territory in so far as “(i) it is differentiated from other organizations operating
6
7

Rokkan 573.
Rokkan 574.
16

in the same territory; (ii) it is autonomous, (iii) it is centralized and (iv) its divisions are
formally coordinated with one another.”8 Tilly applied this conceptualization for the case
of European statehood. He concluded that the key processes that brought about state
formation in Europe were the consolidation of territorial control, the differentiation of
governments from other organizations the acquisition of autonomy, and the reciprocal
recognition of other states’ autonomy by some governments, centralization and
coordination.9 The differentiation of the state from other organizations and autonomy in
particular represent important additions to the standardization phase depicted by
Rokkan’s model.
A more specific categorization of the state is necessary before moving onto
limitations of state power and further into transition to democracy literature and will later
help to qualify the particular state that emerged in Mexico. In the development of the
state within the first two phases of state consolidation as delineated by Stein Rokkan and
Charles Tilly, the particular capabilities and relationship of the state and of society can
have an important impact on the strength of the state that develops. The relative strength
of the state in relation to society and actors within its society in turn impacts the kind of
regime that develops.
This strength is categorized along a continuum between a strong and weak state
and further to a dominant, moderate and failed or even collapsed state. The weakest of
states is one where the interests of various pressure groups pervade over those of the

8
9

Tilly 70.
Ibid.
17

‘state’ and where government institutions exist to serve those interests specifically.10 At
the opposite end of the spectrum is a state that is uniquely capable of molding the society
and culture in which it exists. The extreme case of a strong state is able to change
economic institutions, values, and patterns of interaction among various sectors of
society.11 Between the two extremes exists a ‘moderate’ state. Such a state is able to
maintain some autonomy from the society but cannot impose radical transformation on
economic or cultural systems, it may be able to resist societal pressure but unable to
change the actions of private actors.12
Failed states are characterized by intense, enduring, consuming violence that
overwhelms large swaths of the state.13 There are a number of important indicators of
failed states. They often undergo civil wars stemming from ethnic, religious, linguistic or
class issues. It is common for failed states to victimize their citizens. The line between
weak and failed states is crossed when state-led oppression provokes a counter reaction
by its constituents. Failed states cannot control the regions that are consumed by
violence. Further indicators include the growth of criminal violence, flawed, often totally
absent institutions, deteriorating or destroyed infrastructures, high levels of corruption,
and declining GDP. Failed states often allow for exceptional economic opportunity for
the elites that align themselves with the interests of the aggressor government or non-

10

Krasner, Stephan D. Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investment and
U.S. Foreign Policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978. 55-6. Print.
11
Krasner 56.
12
Krasner 56-7.
13
Rotberg, Robert. When States Fail: Causes and Consequences. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2004. 5. Print.
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state actor. A collapsed state is an extreme of a failed state, whereby political goods are
sought outside the state.14

Hierarchy of Public Goods and State Strength
In considering the relative weakness or strength of a state and the qualifications
for a society to defect from the previous rules of the game, some scholars have identified
a hierarchy of public goods that help to anticipate the expectations of citizens for their
government. It is the duty of states to provide a de-centralized method of delivering
public goods to its citizenry, serve as a channel for organizing the interests of society,
mediate disputes within society and serve as a buffer towards external forces and
influences.15 The ability of the state to ensure the delivery of these public goods, or the
states’ performance, determines the strength of the state, and within these public goods
exists a hierarchy from which state failure or survival often hinges. At the top of the
pyramid of public goods is that of the supply of security, particularly human security.16
Security can include the prevention of cross-border invasions and infiltrations and any
loss of territory, the elimination of domestic threats to national order and social structure,
the prevention of crime, and the facilitating of disputes between citizens without recourse
to arms.17
Secondary public goods include the provision of such expectations such as
systematized methods of adjudicating disputes and the creation and regulation of societal
norms. It generally implies a body of law, security of property and contracts, a functional
14

Rotberg 9.
Rotberg 2.
16
Rotberg 3.
17
Ibid.
15
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judicial system and a legitimizing set of values that are embodied by rule of law.18
Tertiary goods involve the free, open and full participation of citizens in politics and the
political process.19 Clearly, this public good relates directly to the participation phase
elaborated by state consolidation scholars, and by democracy scholars on the essential
ingredients for democracy. Other public goods include deliverables involving health care,
education, various forms of physical infrastructure, channels of commerce,
communication networks, money and banking systems, fiscal institutions, and space for
civil society and methods for regulating the environmental commons.20

Limitations on and Challenges to State Strength and Development
Before moving into transition to democracy literature it is first important to
introduce a few challenges that states face in consolidating their rule. In the case of state
development anywhere in the world, there are a number of limitations and challenges that
face the state as it gains strength. As portrayed in Rokkan’s model, as the state moves
into the latter two phases of its development, the state undergoes tremendous growth in
power capabilities. After obtaining a secure method by which to collect resources from its
constituents, the state often reinvests money into securing great control over its
citizenry—often by way of a strong federal military. This is where the limitations of the
state come into play.
The state is limited in the extent to which society will permit the growth of state
power. In the creation of extreme or ideal ‘stateness’ or a highly controlled society by the

18

Ibid.
Ibid.
20
Ibid.
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bureaucracy apparatus many scholars emphasize the importance of avoiding unrestrained
stateness to prevent revolts.21 According to the experiences of state building in Europe,
scholars have found that often the short-run cost of an increase in stateness results in the
parallel increase in the likelihood of resistance and revolt.22
Others go further with this concept of the limitations of state strength by pointing
out the limitations that exist in the dynamic relationship that exists between exit and
voice options permitted by the state during state creation and the relative consolidation
and integration of the center-core in question. Due to the necessary interaction of men,
commodities and ideas across borders, “You cannot build states without controlling
borders.”23 Basing his argument on the assumption that young states must maintain a
degree of control over its territory, Stein Rokkan argues that states must either reduce
exit options or voice options of its subjects.24 Rokkan reasons, “You cannot reduce both
exit and voice options at the same time without endangering the balance of the
system…during the crucial phases of state-building.”25 He further suggests that low
levels of overall mobilization during state-building corresponded to greater instances of
success in that it gave the national elites time to build up the needed institutional base on
which to enter later phases of participation.26

Extreme ‘stateness’ here is in reference to Charles Tilly’s notion of the state as
measured by formal autonomy, differentiation from non governmental organizations,
centralization, and internal coordination. See Tilly, Charles. Coercion, Capital and
European States: AD 990 - 1992. New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 1992. 34-5. Print.
22
Tilly 35.
23
Rokkan 589.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
26
Rokkan 597.
21

21

Legitimacy and its effect on state stability
Closely related to the limitations of extreme stateness are the limitations
associated with the legitimacy of a state. Juan Linz’s work, “Elements of Breakdown”
regarding the breakdown of democratic regimes, includes an important conceptualization
of the impact and importance of legitimacy, efficacy and effectiveness in maintaining
regime stability.
Legitimacy is defined as a belief that in spite of all shortcomings and failures, the
“existing political institutions are better than any other that might be established and that
they therefore can demand obedience.”27 While this definition of legitimacy rests on the
presumption of democracy, the basic tenants of his argument can be applied to other nondemocratic regimes. A legitimate government is defined as a government that is
considered to be the least evil of the forms of government. Ultimately, democratic
legitimacy is based on the belief that for the particular country at that particular historical
juncture no other type of regime could assume a more successful pursuit of collective
goals.28 Furthermore political socialization plays a decisive role in state legitimacy and in
the case of democratic legitimacy, tradition reinforces legitimacy.
Legitimacy is connected to the concepts of efficacy and effectiveness in that
“Legitimacy… operates as a positive constant that multiplies whatever
positive value the efficacy and effectiveness of the regime might achieve.
It insures effectiveness even in the absence of desirable efficacy, and

27

Linz, Juan. "Elements of a Breakdown." The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes:
Crisis, Breakdown & Reequilibrium. Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins Univeristy Press,
1978. 17-8. Print.
28
Ibid 18.
22

contributes to the ultimate outcome: persistence and relative stability of
the regime.”29
In order to gain legitimacy for itself by fulfilling its duty to serve the collective
goals of a society, the state must prove its efficacy and effectiveness in governing.
Efficacy is defined as the capacity of a regime to solve the basic problems facing any
political system that are perceived as satisfactory by its citizens.30 Linz points out that
efficacy is judged in the long term rather than in the short term, presumably to overlook
short-term failures to favor overall long-term success in providing basic services and
solving basic problems. This can become a problem for new regimes that suffer from
temporary failures, which can lead to a strengthening of supporters for the old regime.
From this comes the conclusion of the high importance and lasting impact of the
formulation of the initial agenda of a new regime for sectors of society but also for the
amount of legitimacy granted to the new regime.
Effectiveness is intimately linked to the concepts of efficacy and legitimacy yet
analytically distinguishable. Effectiveness, in contrast, is defined as the capacity to
implement the policies formulated with the desired results.31 Effectiveness therefore is
linked to the implementation stage of policy making while efficacy is linked to the actual
policy formulation. Linz elaborates on one important kind of ineffectiveness, the inability
to impose order and punish those turning to private violence for political ends.32 The

29

Ibid.
Linz 21.
31
Linz 22.
32
Linz 23.
30
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efficacy and effectiveness of the initial agenda of a new regime if successful reinforces
the legitimacy of the regime, if unsuccessful triggers the mobilization of opposition.33
The relationship between effectiveness and legitimacy is such that ineffectiveness
weakens the authority of the state, which in turn weakens legitimacy of the government.34
In this sense, the effectiveness, and therefore legitimacy, of a regime is closely linked
with the stability of a regime. Since ineffectiveness can include the inability to impose
order or legal sanctions against private violence, an ineffective regime often leads to a
failed state.

Defining Democracy
As the elaboration on state consolidation shows us, after a certain degree of
consolidation among the elites and the ‘penetration’ of Phase I, it is important to slowly
bring larger and larger sectors of the masses into the system and then into active
participation in Phases II and III, and finally, allow for the agencies of redistribution of
Phase IV. The need for an ‘opening up’ of government and increasing the inclusiveness
of sectors of society outside elite circles often come in reaction to some of the breaches of
the limitations on stateness as depicted in the previous section.
There are many definitions of democracy that approach the concept from different
angles. For the purpose of this thesis, I will depend on a minimalist definition of
democracy by perhaps the most often-cited democracy scholar.
Robert Dahl’s “Polyarchy” makes an important contribution to democracy theory
in his attempt to define democracy. In any regime theory, theorists generally define
33
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regime types and paradigms through extreme ideals. Dahl moves beyond the ideal
typology of democracy by defining a new realistic and more easily quantified regime
type in his definition of ‘polyarchy.’
The ideal type of democracy is defined as a political system that is completely or
almost completely responsive to all its citizens.35 The conditions necessary for this kind
of democracy include the unimpaired opportunities to (1) formulate their preferences, (2)
signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and the government by individual and
collective action, and (3) to have their preferences weighed equally in the conduct of the
government, that is, weighed with no discrimination because of the content or source of
the preference.36 In order for the above three opportunities to exist among a populous
state, the institutions of the society must provide at least eight Institutional Guarantees:
1. Freedom to form and join organizations
2. Freedom of expression
3. Right to vote
4. Eligibility for public office
5. Right of political leaders to compete for support
6. Alternative sources of information
7. Free and fair elections
8. Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other
expressions of preference37
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Dahl, like other democracy scholars, was not satisfied with this narrow definition
of democracy. In order to broaden the conceptualization of democracy from these
conditions and guarantees, Dahl poses two theoretical dimensions of democratization as
part of his new categorization of polyarchy. The first is the extent of opposition, public
contestation, or political competition permitted by the state. The second involves the
breadth of public contestation or participation permitted by the state.38 While relative
‘suffrage’ permitted and afforded by the state in elections is considered to be an
important indicator by many democracy scholars, Dahl points out that the degree of
inclusiveness of the regime is a better overall indicator of democratic governance.
Dahl elaborates on four regime types based on these two dimensions of
democracy. The extremes of the dimensions of competition and participation amount not
to democracy per se, but rather to Dahl’s new regime type, polyarchy. While polyarchies
represent a full support of the two dimensions, inclusive hegemonies are regimes in which
full participation is allowed but not public contestation. Competitive oligarchies represent
the opposite regime type where full participation is not permitted but public contestation
is permitted. Lastly, closed hegemonies represent regimes that allow neither public
contestation nor inclusiveness of participation.39 Dahl avoids recognizing all possible
defining characteristics of democracy by using the term Polyarchy to describe real world
systems that most allow both dimensions. Meanwhile, movements along the path towards
polyarchy can be said to represent some degree of democratization. Dahl allows for
approximation in his terminology in recognizing the existence of near-types.
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Transitions to Democracy
In consideration of the above elaboration on democracy, it is important to
underscore literature on the interlocking challenges of maintaining stability while
transitioning to a more democratic regime. Many of the models and categorizations
presented so far depict democracy as simply the next step in state consolidation or the
likely consequence of the overstepping limitations to state strength in the event of a
consolidated authoritarian regime. Transitions to democracy, as history tells us, are far
more complicated than such an oversimplified depiction suggests. This section will
elaborate on the contributions within literature regarding factors contributing to the
smoothness of transitions and common challenges for transitions to democracy.
Robert Dahl suggests several broad historical transformations that are possible for
democratization within the regime framework described above. The first is the
transformation of inclusive hegemonies and competitive oligarchies into nearpolyarchies. From a near-polyarchy, a regime can move towards full polyarchy and from
full polyarchy further democratization can be implemented through the creation of
welfare-state type systems.40 Dahl based his theoretical proposition on the assumption
that the dimensions of competition and participation are the primary steps towards
transitioning towards democracy before any other kind of opening up of control.
Tilly complicates the idea of political change in state development by
underscoring two partly independent processes—state stability and suffrage. He argues
that governments whose relative level of stateness was highest in the 19th century
extended the suffrage faster and faster, but that extensions of the suffrage were more
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durable and supported by surer guarantees in the less state-like governments.41 This
proposal suggests further evidence to the theoretical correlation between high levels of
‘stateness’ with high propensity for revolt.
Not all transitions to democracy happen as a result of a coup d’etats of nondemocratic regimes. Such a move is the result of a sequence of decisions and
rationalizations by the ruling coalition—such was the case of Mexico’s recent transition
to democracy. Robert Dahl contributes a number of axioms under which non-democratic
regimes can voluntarily transition themselves to a democratic system.
Dahl’s axioms seek to present the conditions under which non-democratic
regimes rationalize steps towards polyarchy.
Axiom 1: The likelihood that a government will tolerate an opposition
increases as the expected costs of toleration decrease, (tolerance goes up
as costs of toleration goes down).
Axiom 2: The likelihood that a government will tolerate an opposition
increases as the expected costs of suppression increase.
Axiom 3: The more the costs of suppression exceed the costs of toleration,
the greater the chance for a competitive regime.42
Dahl adds the variable of available resources to the government:
Axiom 4: The likelihood that a government will tolerate an opposition
increases as the resources available to the government for suppression
decline relative to the resources of an opposition.43
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Axiom 5: The likelihood that a government will tolerate an opposition
increases with a reduction in the capacity of the government to use
violence or socioeconomic sanctions to suppress an opposition.44
Dahl makes a key point here in recognizing the impact that resources, including
brute force and socioeconomic sanctions, of both the state and, importantly, of the
opposition can have on the political structure of the state and the rationalization of the
ruling coalition.

Opposition, Parties and Plurality in Governance
Building on the conceptualization of democracy and polyarchy made by Robert
Dahl, the relative tolerance of and the organization within the opposition becomes a
crucial factor in the consolidation of democracies. Rokkan’s model of four phases of state
consolidation allows for the consolidation of elite interests in the initial formulation of
the state and for the opening up of the state towards greater portions of society without
treating the plurality and disunity that such an opening can create. The relative
incorporation of any opposition that develops impacts the regime type of a state. As
elaborated on in Dahl’s five Axioms, there are certain conditions under which nondemocratic regimes justify tolerance towards opposition. With the entrance of the
opposition into the official political sphere of a state, formal organization generally leads
to the creation of opposition parties. Giovanni Sartori contributes important insights on
the establishment of parties and the impact parties have on the development of
democracy.
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While during the initial stages of state consolidation, elite consolidation is,
generally speaking, a necessary phenomenon; unity within the ruling coalition becomes
less urgent as the state stabilizes its rule. As the state becomes more and more complex,
disunity is nearly inevitable and factions within the ruling party result.45
The rise of pluralism and the parallel development of parties and party systems
are conceptualized by Giovanni Sartori. Sartori builds directly on the proposals in Dahl’s
Axioms in suggesting that pluralism in government arises from the parallel process of
intolerance to toleration, from toleration to dissent, and, with dissent to believing in
diversity.46
In defining pluralism Sartori conceptualizes the notion at three levels—cultural
pluralism (heterogeneousness of culture), societal pluralism (societal differentiation), and
political pluralism (political dissent).47 The presence of political dissent is said neither to
translate directly from the opposite of consensus nor directly from conflict. Plurality
requires a careful balance and ongoing presence of both dissent and consensus, whereby
consensus should not convey uniform unanimity but rather invoke a sense of cooperation
and compromise. Sartori posits a very apt interpretation of the development of party
systems in relations to the development of the state,
“Perhaps the polity must exit first, perhaps unification has to precede party
“partition,” and perhaps this is the condition that makes parties a
subdivision compatible with unity rather than a division that disrupts it.
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This is supported by the experience of most of the developing societies
bent upon constructing a national identity and integration, which have
quickly resorted to the single party or to military rule, and in either case to
banishing organized dissent, that is, opposition.”48
Sartori posits an additional position regarding pluralism. Pluralism, he suggests,
develops often as a result of religious, political or class-based disconnections whereby the
stakes of political controversy are so high so as to justify the surrendering of power
within a competitive party system.49 One disconnect that he highlights as a common
spark to party systems are the wars and conflicts over religion. Religion, and other
societal values of high importance represent one of many occasions where heterogeneity
of a society creates disconnect to spark factions that can lead to the creation of opposition
parties.
As parties emerge from factions that begin to be tolerated within a political
system, the relationship between parties and the state may take various forms. Certainly
we know of the forms of one, two and multi-party systems, but within those systems it is
important to distinguish precise relationships. Among the three there is (i) the party that
remains external to the sphere of government, Sartori calls this the ambassador party, (ii)
the party that operates within government without governing, and (iii) the party that
actually takes on the governmental function.50
The parliamentary party development that Sartori explores in his elaboration on
responsible and responsive government must be presented in order to evaluate where
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Mexico diverges from the path towards plurality in party systems. Parallel to the
evolution of plurality in a polity is the evolution of responsible government. Responsible
government is defined by Sartori as the responsibility of ministers to parliament, which
does not necessarily entail responsibility within a party-based system. The institution of
Parliament in the cases studied by Sartori and his predecessor, Burke, represented the
shift from control of the people to control for the people, and in the very first stages for
the people was not intended to imply by the people.51 In this sense virtual representation
preceded actual electoral representation.
Sartori rationalizes that a government responsible to its houses of parliament will
in the long run become a responsive government attentive to, and influenced by its
people.52 Sartori states that members of parliament came to justify the use of greater
enfranchisement into the electorate as a way to pursue their own interests as they began
to defect from unanimity. It is with the extension of suffrage that parties emerge. And it is
when enfranchisement reaches a “critical mass” that a party system emerges.53 Sartori
remains purposefully vague in the precise size qualification for this final step. In so doing
he disregards the possibility for regimes to extend official suffrage without giving
credence to the electoral system and the impact that such a system would have on the
development of parties and party systems.
The final contribution made by Sartori that is useful to the topic of this thesis is
the distinction between one-party and no-party states. While the party-less or pre-party
states and antiparty states imply justifications for the lack of parties, the one-party state
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implies a question as to why the one-party rather than party-less state. Sartori explains
that one-party systems only could emerge after the establishment of party systems in the
world arena and where a society has already emerged suitably politicized.54 Single party
systems emerged only after Western democracies had established the expectation of
large, nearly universal enfranchisement and the emergence of party systems and mass
party bases.55
The systemic unit is such that the single party is essentially a duplication of the
state and vice versa, the state is a duplicate of the party. As he explains the system is the
byproduct of party office whereby a bureaucratic merit system exists alongside a party
career system. In regard to the question of competition within a single party system
Sartori provides an argument against the theory proposed by others that intra-party
competition can substitute for inter-party competition by the traditional notion of
competitive democratic regimes. Dissent within a party, he argues induces more of a
“private” than a “functional” contest.

Loyalty and Disloyalty in the Opposition
Sartori touches on the subtle evolution of the opposition parties themselves in his
mentioning of the movement from toleration to dissent. In many cases, opposition parties
that arise from non-democratic regimes must tread more carefully than those in
democratic regimes. The first opposition parties to be tolerated by the state are largely
unprecedented and generally take a number of years, or decades to build the support and
reputation to compete fairly of positions of power.
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Juan Linz elaborates this careful balance in his conceptualization of the loyal and
disloyal opposition. Sartori presented the concept of factions in the context of the
development of party systems. Regime transitions, or in some cases regime stability as
we will see, are impacted by the development of two distinct types of oppositions—the
loyal and disloyal. Disloyal opposition, according to Linz, is essentially anarchosyndicalists or secessionist movements who refuse to abide by the existing rules of the
game to bring about change. Linz defies the general conceptualization of political
opposition in his definition of loyal opposition. While disloyal opposition are defectors
from the existing state system, loyal opposition are actors that remain committed to
change via legal means for gaining power rather than through the use of force.56 The
political forces constituting the loyal opposition to a democratic regime are ideally
characterized by the following:
1. A public commitment to achievement of power only by electoral means
and willingness to surrender to other participants with the same
commitment.
2. A rejection of the use of violent means to achieve and maintain power.
3. A rejection of any non-constitutional appeal to the armed forces.
4. A rejection of the rhetoric of violence to mobilize support.
5. A commitment to participate in the political process, elections and
parliamentary activity.
6. A willingness to assume the responsibility to govern or be party of the
majority when no alternative government by system parties is possible.
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7. A willingness to join with opponents ideologically distant but committed
to the survival of the democratic political order.
8. A rejection of secret contacts with the disloyal opposition and a rejection
of its support when offered.
9. The readiness to denounce to a legitimate democratic government the
activities of opposition forces or the armed forces aiming at the overthrow
of that government.
10. A commitment in principle to reduce the political role of neutral powers,
like presidents and kings, the judiciary and the armed forces to narrow
limits to assure the authenticity of the democratic political process.57
Linz applies his qualifications to democracy in crisis, while in the case at hand we
will apply this concept of loyalty of the opposition to a stable, non-democratic regime
with the ironic commitment of the opposition to remaining within the system.

Power and Interdependence
In the development of a state, regardless of the regime type or party system, the
policies made and implemented by a state impact the reactions of others in the world
around them. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in their work, Power and
Interdependence, introduce the impact that policies have on the relationships of states
within the world arena. The dynamics of power and interdependence can be applied to
the policies within a state as well and will provide key insights in the discussion of power
dynamics in the case of Mexico.
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Keohane and Nye posit that asymmetrical interdependence can be source of
power—power as defined as the control over resources or the potential to affect
outcomes.58 This asymmetry, however, as Keohane and Nye point out, is rarely a one-toone relationship. The political bargaining capabilities of actors have a large impact on
this. At the domestic level power relations of actors represent the relationship between
the state and key actors in society, such as the state and labor, the state business.
In order to distinguish varying degrees of interdependence one must distinguish
the dimensions of sensitivity and vulnerability. Sensitivity involves the responsiveness of
actors within a policy framework. Sensitivity in terms of dependence means liability to
costly effects imposed from outside before policies are altered to try to change the
situation.59 At the national level, sensitivity could refer to the costly reactions of a
politicized society to policy changes by the state. Vulnerability interdependence, in
contrast, refers to the costs of adjusting to the change.60 Some states will endure a heavier
cost of policy changes of a state in which they depend on for something, generally a
resource such as oil, than other states that may have other alternatives more readily
available.

Conclusion
The scholarly work presented in this chapter outlines the core theory that this
thesis will expand on for the case of Mexico. Stein Rokkan’s theory on the phases of state
creation and consolidation and his emphasis on the impact of relative time spent at each
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phase, the degree of exit and voice permitted by the state and the various factors enabling
the creation of the state will all be considered later in the examination of the case of
Mexico. Charles Tilly also contributed important conceptualizations of the notion of the
state, key factors of state making in Europe and the impact that extreme ‘stateness’ can
have on state stability. The points made by Rokkan and Tilly and the elaboration by Dahl
on the long-term political goal of opening up inclusiveness of the state and the rise of
opposition sectors of society will guide the discussion on Mexico’s long awaited
transition towards democracy. Furthermore, Dahl’s axioms on the relation of state
toleration of opposition and the impact of relative resources of each will be essential in
the investigation on Mexico’s transition. The presentation of party systems by Giovanni
Sartori, the power and interdependence concepts contributed by Keohane and Nye and
the conceptualization of efficacy and effectiveness and their relationship to state, and
regime legitimacy will guide the discussion of legitimacy in the particular state-party and
state-society systems that developed in Mexico. The assumptions and propositions made
by Sartori and Linz in particular will be applied and analyzed in consideration of the case
study of Mexico. The topics delineated here of state creation and state stability and
finally of the transition towards democracy by Rokkan, Tilly and Dahl will serve to guide
the following examination of the case of Mexico.
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Historical Review of the Case Study

Pre-Colonial and Colonial Heritage
The Spanish conquest and colonial rule over Mexico, spanning more than three
centuries, was the primary center of Spanish rule in the New World. As such, Mexico
inherited a large bureaucratic apparatus that had once been capable of overseeing all
colonial regions. This highly structured bureaucratic system operated within a strict
hierarchical structure based on obedience to Castile and to the Catholic Church. The
social divisions and inequalities that were to plague Mexican society throughout the
subsequent historical epochs owe their origins to the sharp racial, ethnic, cultural and
religious tensions that this era created.
The creation and consolidation of the Mexican state owes much to its colonial and
pre-colonial heritage. From the colonial period one can identify a number of important
legacies. These include the legacies of corporatism, social inequality, special interests,
cultural intolerance, and Spanish Bureaucratic tradition (within this, personalization of
power).1 Many of the legacies are rooted in the Catholic Church. The religious heritage of
the Catholic Church, with its influence over social organizations and education had a
long-lasting impact on Mexican society. For instance, the legacy of corporatism can be
traced to the special privileges afforded to the Church by the colonial government. The
special relationship between the church and the state and other groups served as the
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predecessor of a continued use of corporatism and special interests in preferred
relationships between the state and groups within society.
Other important legacies of the colonial and pre-colonial period are those of
social inequality and intolerance of difference. Both the Aztec heritage of ruthless
absolute rule by spiritual leaders and the bureaucratic authoritarian rule of Spanish
colonial rule influenced the deepening of the socio-economic, cultural and racial
inequalities in Mexican society. The close integration of Church and State led to the
Catholic Church’s monopoly of Mexican religion and further, of social organization.
Finally, the central hub of the Spanish Colonial Empire built in the ashes of the once
mighty Aztec capital contributed to the subsequent centralization of the Mexican state
around Mexico City.
The colonial period served an important role in Mexican history in its initial
penetration into the depths of state territory and organization of initial bureaucratic
traditions. In comparison to British colonial rule to the North, the Spanish did not leave
such long lasting institutions that would carry over so directly to the consolidation of the
new independent state. The education system organized under colonial rule was more of a
product of the Catholic Church and indeed, the Jesuit missionaries, than of the Spanish
bureaucracy. Evidence of the military tradition of the Viceroy did not remain a heavy
influence on the early Mexican state; instead it was the unruly regional bosses or caciques
that came to characterize the Mexican equivalent of ‘organized’ armed forces. The
system of taxation to the Viceroy, so very hated by the independence forces took a long
time to be brought back into the bureaucratic system of Mexico. The legacies of the
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controlled Colonial era would very soon be overshadowed by the anarchy following
independence.

From Independence to Porfiriato
Mexico officially won its independence in August 1821 when the final remaining
Spanish viceroy was forced to sign the Treaty of Córdoba. To this day, however,
Independence is celebrated on September 16th to celebrate a day eleven years prior to
official independence when Father Miguel Hidalgo, a small village priest issued his
famous grito calling for independence. Though the brief popular uprising led by Hidalgo
was violently suppressed by viceregal and royalist forces, the continued recognition of
the first popular call for independence marks the first disconnect between the wishes of
the haves and the have nots that has continued to this day. The treaty was negotiated by
Agustín de Iturbide, a royalist who had also negotiated the Plan de Iguala, by which
Mexico would become ruled as a limited monarchy, with the Roman Catholic Church as
the official state Church and equal rights and upper-class status for the Spanish and
mestizo populations, exempting the majority mulatto and indigeno population.2
The period immediately following independence for Mexico in 1821 was marked
by distinct continuities and discontinuities from the colonial period. After gaining
independence, the exacting bureaucratic structure of the colonial system was left in a
precarious position. The nationalist surge that had briefly unified for the independence
movement quickly broke into factions of liberal and conservative bases, both sides
lacking the organizational prowess and unity to fully take on the job of state building.
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Independence did not bring any immediate revolutionary change to the structure of the
colonial government or the disarray of the internal factions during independence struggle.
In effect, this meant the substitution of royal bureaucracy by the ‘army,’ which at the
time was made up of supporters of the man sitting in the Presidential chair. The
Constitutional Congress of February 1822 broke down at the hands of the Bourbanist and
republican factions, however both united against Iturbide.3 Iturbide, having declared
himself emperor of the new Mexican state was finally overthrown by his former aide,
General Antonio López de Santa Anna. Nationalist hero Santa Anna declared Mexico a
Republic.4
An important continuity from the colonial period was the ongoing ideological
discord between the Royalists and the Liberals. The primary political discords following
independence surrounded the issues of how the new state system would be structured.
The camps were first divided between the liberals, in favor of a federal system and the
conservatives, preferring to emulate the centralized system that the Spanish had utilized.5
While the bitter struggle between Centralist and Federalist forces began, the
young fragile state faced a number of major threats to its sovereignty. After Santa Anna
easily defeated a final Spanish invasion in 1829, another invasion occurred ten years later
in 1838, shaking the young state. The French invaded Veracruz in an effort to exact
compensation for damages to French-owned property.6 While these invasions did spark
nationalist sentiment surrounding the generals like Santa Anna who had maintained
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Mexico’s sovereignty, it was not enough to mobilize a strong state-building momentum
or to properly prepare for future threats to Mexico’s sovereignty.
The Federalists-Bourbanists tensions came to a head during the War of the
Reform between 1858 and 1861, under which the fleeting victory of the Liberals allowed
them to briefly enforce the Constitution of 1857. Due to the inability to consolidate their
own power domestically, the conservatives regarded the ensuing French invasion and
state intervention in a positive light, assuming a European monarch would better serve
their own interests.7 This was probably also due in part to the unwillingness of the
liberals to compromise.8
The discontinuities of the period following independence would have a long-term
impact on the young state. Two events during the lead up to the Liberal Reform period
represent key turning points in Mexico. The first was the Mexican-American War in 1845
to 1848, where Mexico lost a large portion of its territory to the United States.9 This
moment would forever be a bitter memory in Mexican political memory and determine
much of the future attitudes for foreign relations with the Northern goliath.
The second key event was the French intervention that began in 1861 when
President Benito Juárez suspended the interest payments to foreign countries due to the
heavy accumulation of debt to its key creditor nations: Spain, France and Britain.10
Juarez’s presidency was interrupted by the rule of the Hapsburg monarch, Maximilian I.
After invading Veracruz, Maximilian and his wife Carlota were appointed by the French
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Crown as Mexico’s new emperors.11 After France withdrew its support, Maximilian and
his remaining supporters did not last long before he was executed on June 19, 1867.12
The short-lived Mexican Empire served to completely discredit the conservative faction
and enabled the Liberal party to consolidate the state.
The Restored Republic sought to replace the old order with a modern foundation
by enacting a series of reform laws largely aimed at weakening the church.13 While this
era is called the liberal era or La Reforma, the liberals were pro liberty without an
emphasis on equality. In their attack on the church, they also made way for regional
oligarchs to take charge, especially during the expropriation of church lands. In this way
the “liberal” era in Mexican history supported the liberties of some but certainly not
equality for all.
While the Liberals implemented a number of new policies, the state in no small
measure remained disunited and unconsolidated. Many authors emphasize regionalism
and fragmentation that continued to plague the state building process.14 Even after the
war with the French, indeed despite it, and despite the popularity of Juárez as a leader,
the country was even further away from integration. After ten years of war and the
fragmentation that resulted from Maximilian’s rule, the economy was in chaos and was
more dependent than ever on Europe.
While as a colony, the political elite in Mexico did not have to concern
themselves with foreign relations, as a young state foreign relations would emerge as a
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major concern very early on. Mexico’s relationship with the U.S., which would come to
represent a key factor in Mexican state politics, began during this era. The relationship
began with the bitter loss of one half of Mexican territory.15 As a young and highly
unorganized ‘state’ Mexico had no defense against the expansionist interests of the
goliath to the North. This encounter would leave Mexicans distrustful of its neighbor and
also probably gave greater urgency to the need to consolidate the state and consolidate
control over its remaining territory. Mexico’s foreign relations, with creditors abroad and
domestically, and its state stability was first consolidated under the man that whose name
became associated with an entire era: Porfirio Diaz.

Porfiriato
While on paper the Mexican state at the close of the Liberal period resembled a
young European state, in reality the state remained highly disunited among regional,
economic and cultural factions. The liberals fell in 1867 to Porfirio Diaz, a General from
the War of French Intervention, after two attempts by Diaz to unseat the popular
president, Benito Juarez.16 While the Diaz administrations did not represent any overt
discontinuities from previous administrations, his did introduce important additions to
Mexican state policies, state structures and ideologies.
Diaz rose to power as positivist political ideologies began to make a presence in
Latin America. Positivist thought held special credence for the case of Mexico at this
time. Positivism was based on the notion that political policies should be formed
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scientifically and that liberty and progress should be sought through peace and order.17
This preference for order impacted the policies and attitudes of the Diaz administration in
his personal push for political stability and economic growth. Diaz sought to attack the
detrimental self-perpetuating cycle of economic stagnation and political instability by
enforcing centralized control over Mexican society.
With this ideological mindset, the Diaz administration remodeled the state
structure of Mexico. Diaz did achieve political stability and peace in what has become
known as Pax Porfiriana.18 He achieved peace through a combination of repression,
conciliation or pacification and cooptation. As a military man, Diaz sought to establish
the armed forces as a key institution for keeping the peace and consolidating control over
the anarchic society. Prior to Porfiriato, the military essentially consisted of disorganized
groups of strong men loyal to individuals and the state. Diaz increased the state’s military
expenditure, buying arms from Europe and appointing many of his army friends in
political offices.19 Thanks to this institutionalization of the military completed under his
administration, Diaz established a pattern for civil-military relations that were to last until
the 1940’s. Under this system, there existed no clear subordination but a legacy of shared
power and interlocking leadership.20
In addition to building the military, Porfiriato established greater control and
stability for Mexico by building an effective federal bureaucracy and by controlling
elections. During the span of the Diaz administrations between 1876 and 1910, for
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instance, the payroll of the federal bureaucracy increased by 900%.21 What would
become a long history of election rigging, the Diaz administration controlled national
elections through a combination of economic rewards for supporters, pacification,
corruption, press censorship, and in the case of the Yaquis Indian revolt and others,
through violent suppression.22 It is in this sense that Diaz’s interpretation and
implementation of positivist-inspired ideology was focused on establishing order and
stability over liberty.
Diaz also succeeded in expanding the span of control of the federal state to
regional localities in order to prevent the rise of regional bosses and movements that
could threaten the regime. Diaz used the newly consolidated military power and
increased economic strength of the state to reign in the feudal fiefdoms that had
continued to threaten the hegemony of the state. Diaz strategically allowed caciques to
enrich themselves and placed military commanders with no connection to the region in
question as a check to those caciques and to oversee officials. Loyalty to central rather
than local governments was a priority in official appointees. He also established a check
on the power of the army by establishing nacional rurales as professional police force to
reinforce his policies.23 Diaz accomplished the initial steps of establishing lasting state
institutions, of particular importance the empowerment yet control of the military and
regional bureaucratic structure.
It was only once a greater societal and political stability was attained that Diaz
could focus on his dream for Mexico: economic progress. He took three important steps
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towards state development: i) subjugated the Northern frontier; ii) began to take small
measures in expropriating land to peasants, and iii) initiated the making of a ruling class
and the emergence of a middle class.24
The subjugation of the Northern Frontier not only brought the anarchic Northern
region under state authority; it also opened the way for Sonoran political leaders to enter
the political scene. The expropriation of peasant land was a step away from the liberal
land policies of the Reform era. The initial steps towards institutionalization of the state
helped initiate the making of a ruling elite while the economic progress accomplished
under the regime sparked the first emergence of a middle class.
Two key policies for social issues were implemented under Porfiriato. Diaz
sought to reverse two relationships the state had inherited from his liberal predecessors:
those with the Church and with the Indian populations. Adding to the ample evidence
placing Diaz in the authoritarian political camp, Diaz sought reconciliation with the
Church. Always the structural realist, Diaz maintained a pragmatic relationship with the
Church allowing it to strengthen its religious role while remaining subservient to the
State.25 As for the Indian population, Diaz considered the Indians to be obstacles to
Mexican development. To remedy this problem Diaz sought to attract European
immigrants to settle in Mexico.26
The period of Porfiriato denoted some very significant yet in some ways
ambiguous contributions to the consolidation of the state; most were steps forward
however some were steps away from consolidation. Clearly the most important step
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forward was the total control and relative stability that Diaz was able to enforce over the
region that had been dominated by regional caciques and to create an effective system of
centralized control. Related, the economic progress that was achieved under the regime
must not be underestimated. While centralizing the state was a vital step for state
consolidation, the personalist qualities of the regime left the state vulnerable to economic
and political threats.
Also somewhat ambiguous was the institutionalization of the state that occurred
under Porfiriato. While Diaz was able to establish the state as a central political unit, the
degree or quality of durability that this institutionalization would have was uncertain.
Some scholars have pointed out that although Diaz strengthened the role of state in
society, he did not legitimize its institutions. 27 In reality, the state was strengthened for
the purpose of retaining power for Diaz and not for the purpose of actual state
consolidation. In the case of Mexico, considering the relative non-consolidation of the
state in the period preceding it, Porfiriato represented a substantial leap forward for state
consolidation. Of course this leap landed on unsteady ground due to the various problems
and challenges inherent in the institutions built under the personalized rule by Diaz.

The Revolutionary Era
Historians and political scholars disagree over the precise causes of the
Revolution. Nevertheless, the causes and consequences of what happened during the
Revolution provide substantial insight to the kind of regime that followed it and the rise
of the PRI.
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In broad terms, the extensive modernization policies of the Diaz administration
can be considered a root cause of the Revolution. Ironically, the heavy inflow of
investment from abroad, accompanied by the decision to adopt the gold standard, led to
the sharp rise in prices and to the outbreak of a major economic crisis in 1907 and 1908.28
This economic crisis, characterized by high unemployment and supplemented by a
devastating draught, led to popular unrest due to the level of desperation of the people
and to the refusal of the administration to grant any kind of relief to any segment of the
population, rich or poor. Others relevant factors were the negative effects of foreign
economic penetration, the deepening class struggle exacerbated by Porifirato policies for
economic development and an overall clash of modernity and tradition.29
From a political standpoint, many of the social policies of Porfiriato and the
overall state structure of the regime have been cited as contributing to the outbreak of
civil unrest. Perhaps either as a result of apathy of the long installed Porfirian machine, or
from the miscalculated perception of the degree of pacification of society, the regime’s
consensus of ‘amificación’ with the upper and middle class showed signs of withering by
1910.30 Related, the much used repression tools of the regime had become more visible.
The vulnerability of the regime due to the presidentialism of Diaz brought uncertainty
over the succession of the aging president and cronies and represented a sign of the
overall breakdown of the regime.31
Perhaps most important of these factors was the distancing and increasing
alienation of significant upper and middle class leaders, both regional and within the
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centralized system. Regardless of the manner of the fall of Diaz, the key to the future was
the rise of a capable class that would have a viable chance at opposing the Diaz machine
and mobilizing the factions within the opposition.
The somewhat successful rise of a viable opponent to Diaz came in the form of
Francisco Madero, son of wealthy Coahuilan landowners.32 Founder of the AntiReelectionist Party to oppose Diaz, Madero advocated for the basic principles of political
liberties and some moderate social reforms. Though his campaign did not officially win
the election of 1910, Madero’s platform of “Effective suffrage, no reelection” gained
national recognition and would become a mantra of the revolution.33 After he lost the
election, Madero issued his Plan de San Luis de Potosí, accusing Diaz of defrauding the
elections and assumed the role of provisional president, calling for a mass revolt against
the regime.34 Madero’s planned “small revolution” went haywire with uprisings sparked
all over the country from the state of Chihuahua to his home state of Coahuila to the
states of more radical revolutionaries of Pascual Orozco, Francisco Villa and Emiliano
Zapata.35 Madero took over with the signing of the Treaty of Ciudad Juárez.36
While the revolution may not have been the product of an organized revolutionary
movement of the masses, it was not completely deprived of an ideological origin. Ricardo
Flores Magón represents one of the important precursors to the Revolution and its
culmination in the 1917 Constitution. Through his liberal clubs, Magón offered
arguments in support of works’ rights, establishment of minimum wage principles,
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maximum hours in strike documents and liberal party platforms, the return of
communally owned Indian properties and a productive land requirement.37
The period between 1910 and 1914 consisted of a number of challenges to
Madero’s presidency that had a negative effect on the stability of the country and the
state. During his short term Madero faced opposition in the form of political meddling
from the U.S. under the Woodrow Wilson administration, the organization of opposition
from the Orquista supporters, and pressure from the Catholic Church, the cientificos and
the increasingly organized labor sector.38 The governments throughout the decade were
preoccupied with the recognition of their administrations by the U.S. and Great Britain,
who represented important foreign investors for the struggling new nation.39
The Carranza administration had a significant task set out for them in the
“reconstruction of the fatherland.” Through this policy, the administration sought to
restore business and commerce by regularizing railroad service, by reducing the size and
maintaining the control of the military and creating a new constitution for the state.40
Carranza was able to accomplish some initial steps of reconstruction by raising taxes on
foreign companies, establishing a central bank, and promoting Mexican business.41 Not
all were successes but importantly the 1917 Constitution did get passed and economic
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recovery slowly returned beginning in May 1917.42 Obregón, whose supporters had made
up 80 of the first 200 deputies in the new Congress formed by Carranza’s 1917
Constitution, overthrew Carranza in 1920.43 After much political turmoil and
renegotiation of alliances, Obregón was formally elected president in 1920, granting the
North-Westerners the responsibility of reconstruction.44 Some point out that this was
more of an unsteady triumph of military might since these new elites lacked the business
ties and political know-how for real consolidation of the establishment.45
Certain themes and consequences of the Revolution represent important
influences to the evolution of the political system and the prospect for state consolidation
and stability. A new call for greater social justice was an overall theme of all sectors
mobilized during the Revolution. Popular leaders of the Revolution, Madero, Villa and
Zapata, related to this general theme in their demands for fairer distribution of national
income, expanded public education, improved access, a larger state role in the economy
in order to defend against outsiders as well as some calls for more effective suffrage.46
Despite the total destruction that seemed to characterize the entire decade, some
political themes did prove to have lasting influence. Madero first coined the political
mythology of the revolution in his platform against Diaz demanding, “Effective Suffrage,
No Reelection.”47 This theme represents both exaggerated political propaganda and a
reality that would be followed to the ‘T’ for the rest of the century. It is hard to argue that
suffrage was extended past the level it was under Porfiriato, however it is clear that
42

Bethell 178.
Ibid.
44
Bethell 196.
45
Bethell 197.
46
Camp 45.
47
Camp 47.
43

52

effective suffrage remained an ideal and not fully desired by those in power. The
platform designed to protect against the kind of extended rule by Diaz, however, would
have zero or no real exceptions for the rest of the century.
Another important impact of the Revolution on the political structure was the
domination by Revolutionary generals in administrative positions that continued from
1914 to 1934.48 Whereas Diaz had strategically maintained a careful relationship of
control over the military during his rule, after the militarized era of the Revolution, the
political leaders and particularly the Presidents until 1940 were all, with one exception,
generals who fought in battles of the Revolution.48 This practice of appointing military
cronies to important political offices became a central part of the regimes that came out
of the Revolution.
The Revolution initially had lasting impact on the relationship of business with
the state. The deals and bargains that Diaz had carefully negotiated had been an important
part of the political stability and economic development of the state. When Diaz fell,
these deals collapsed, leaving a gaping hole for the health and the stability of the political
economy. Some firms were left without their preferential treatment afforded to them
previously and other firms saw an opportunity to get a bigger piece of the pie. Factions
emerged within the business sector and rivalry between foreign banks and companies for
concessions created new conflict between small firms and established firms.49 Following
the 1907 economic crash, some businessmen actually believed that a revolution was the
only step that they could take to promote their interests. This worked out in their benefit
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in the long run considering the close relationship that business was afforded under the
PRI.
Several new overall attitudes towards key issues also shifted as a result of the
Revolution. The relationship of the state with the Church shifted back to the prePorfiriato attitude by reinstituting the removal of religion from primary education, taking
away the Church’s right to own property and restricting the clergy’s potential political
actions. These attitudes were reflected in the 1917 Constitution.50 Another issue of
previous contention, land, was affected by the Revolution. The industrializing policies of
Diaz were reversed with the establishment of the ejido system or communal land, by
breaking up large landholdings.51 Impacted by the ideals of Ricardo Flores Magón, the
1917 Constitution legalized strikes and granted labor the right to collective bargaining
and established the revolutionary concept of social security.52 Finally, with the passing of
the new Constitution in 1917, a new level of legitimacy was afforded to these ideas in a
new constitutionalism attitude of the society.53 Though some scholars argue that the new
constitution was not broadly or deeply popular and that it barely survived as an
institutional contract.54
The Revolutionary decade left Mexican society ready for the development of a
state system that would need to recognize the interests of labor and the rural poor as well
as well as incorporate broad political and economic elite previously excluded from the
Diaz rule. What remained to be seen was how the reconstructed state would choose to

50

Camp 47.
Ibid.
52
Ibid.
53
Ibid.
54
Bethell 175-8.
51

54

implement these themes and the relationship that the state would establish with business
and the military. The system could not ignore the influential personalities of popular
Revolutionaries.

Reconstruction
The decade of the 1920’s is known as a period of reconstruction and renaissance
whereby the new Constitution and state slowly recovered from the destruction of the
revolutionary decade and consolidated the gains of its people. This decade was
characterized by the recreation and consolidation of a capitalist state, made possible by
the newly acquired peace, relatively speaking. Despite the conclusion of the bloodiest
decade of the Revolution, conflict continued during this decade, the most significant of
which were with oil companies, the Church and organized labor.55
Even with the new constitution, the state emerged from the Revolutionary era
structurally weak and still facing the formidable task of reckoning with the regional
strongmen whose compliance or cooperation underpinned the future stability of the
state.56 The presidencies of this era—Huerta, Obregón, and Calles—are known as the
Sonoran dynasty. These men believed that Mexico should be developed through private
capital with particular interest in targeting agriculture and industrial expansion.
There were a number of political crises during this decade that would threaten the
weak foundations of the state. The Cristero Rebellion in 1926 to 1928 of Roman Catholic
peasants sought political recognition after decades of political exclusion. A new
economic crisis began as early as 1925 for Mexico and was further aggravated in 1927 by
55
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falling oil and mineral prices. The Revolutionary National Party, the future PRI would be
Calles’ response to these crises as an attempt to consolidate political stability.57
This decade was also an important test for the new Constitution as to how it was
to be interpreted, implemented and accepted by both Mexican citizens and by foreigners
abroad. An important example of this was Article 27 that returned original ownership of
‘lands and waters’ to the Nation.58 As a heavy importer of oil, this article represented a
major threat to U.S. interests.59 Though Obregon effectively sold out to U.S. pressure on
this issue, the decision indicates the desperate state of security felt in Mexico at the time
and the powerful influence of U.S. interests.
After stepping down in 1924 Obregón successfully campaigned and won
reelection only to be assassinated before taking office in 1928. Obregón’s presidency
(1920-1924) succeeded in reestablishing a relationship with both the U.S. and other
foreign actors and also reestablishing federal authority over the revolutionary
regionalism, the first substantial steps in reconstructing the Mexican state.60 Establishing
relations with the United States and killing revolutionary rebels, of course meant nothing
for the consolidation of a stable state without the parallel fostering of nationalism,
continued maintenance of threats and establishment of institutions to adjudicate disputes
that could lead to uprisings.
The ambition that characterized Obregón and his reluctance to step down from
power would become a theme of many of the presidencies to come. His successor,
57
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Plutarco Elías Calles, would be the high point of this theme. This presidential succession
effectively brought an end to any ideological radicalism that had lingered on from the
Revolutionary fervor and the other two branches of government were brought into
submission to the ‘Revolutionary Family.’ Known as the jefe maximo, Calles was able to
do what Obregón had only dreamt of doing; he was able to continue to exercise real
power after officially stepping down from power.61 Calles essentially followed a policy
of classic economic liberalism by distancing the government from the private sector and
restoring the railroads to the private sector.
Three important policy shifts of Calles led to further political turmoil—a new
eruption over oil with the U.S., the re-election crisis and a crisis of Church-State
relations. Seeking to gain nationalistic sentiment for his administration Calles briefly
rebelled from U.S. interests reneging on Obregon’s previous agreement over oil. Calles
consolidated stability in his repression of the Cristero Rebellion, which had arisen after
Carranza and Obregón refused to enforce anti-clerical articles of the new constitution.62
The re-election crisis represented an important test for policy choices regarding
the tensions with the U.S. and the Church as well as the very foundation of the newly
consolidated state. Through a series of political pressures Calles was forced to allow the
Obregonistas to amend the Constitution to permit Obregón to run for reelection. The
Partido Nacional Revolucionario was formed in reaction to the political instability that
had characterized each presidential succession since Madero and in reaction to the threat
that political ambition of past presidents had represented. The assassination of Obregón
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would forever be a reminder that the Mexican state was formed on at least one half of the
revolutionary principle of “Effective Sufferage, no reelection.”

The Founding of the PRI
The period of the late 1920’s to late 1930’s represented a shift to a very important
new era in Mexican political history from a period of territorial and elite consolidation to
broader consolidation in the structure and legitimacy of the new state. While instability
remained a theme during this period, the state had survived through enough years and
presidencies that it could begin to concentrate on longer-term needs.
The assassination of Obregón and the election of 1928 were followed by a
concern over the need to stabilize the state, legitimize power and prolong the hegemony
of the Northern dynasty by Calles and his henchman.63 The idea of forming a party
became the method of choice, as it would serve a number of interests for the Party. It
would help deal with the instability caused by the presidential succession, it would
legitimize the power of the regime by respecting the principle of “No Reelection” and
could incorporate militant agrarista, labor leaders, military strongmen, regional bosses,
industrialists, commercial landowners, merchants and others all within an inclusive yet
hierarchical party structure.64
To achieve this end, the ruling elite sought to formalize its mission to guarantee
unity and solidarity over decisive selfishness in a pact called the Querétaro Pact of Union
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and Solidarity.65 This was essentially an agreement in which the ruling political leaders
pledged their willingness to (1) accept the policies and candidates of the new party, (2)
submit to party discipline and (3) refuse the use of armed force in the resolution of
political conflicts all in order to smooth over political differences that persisted at the
time.66 While Plutarco Elías Calles originally created the new party in order to
institutionalize the perpetuation of his own power, the creation of the party legitimized
the perpetuation of a new “revolutionary coalition,” and created a method for stable and
reliable political recruitment for the regime.67

The Rise and Fall of Cardenismo
Calles might have officially created the PNR during his continued influence
known as the Maximato in 1929, but the party itself only consolidated under the
administration of Lázaro Cárdenas. The ruling forces of the 1920’s had struggled to find
a way to effectively control and co-opt the various factions within the rising ‘political
nation’ of Mexico.
By the 1930’s the large landholders had regained much of their influence, but the
non-landholding majority of the society remained a constant threat to the young nation.
Despite the fact that he saw Cardenas as an extremist, Calles chose Cárdenas to succeed
him as President because he needed to avoid a confrontation with progressives who
distrusted him.68 This plan did not pan out as Calles had hoped. Cardenas had come to
power in the familiar way of the past twenty years through military service and political
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loyalty to the northern dynasty. He had also won allegiance of peasants in his own state
of Michoacan through his distribution of hacienda lands during his term as governor
there.69 In the 1934 election, Cárdenas attracted both those who felt marginalized or
frustrated by Callista rule and loyal Callistas.
Cardenismo was characterized by a handful of progressive initiatives on state
building, capitalist development and corporatism. Cárdenismo was above all, a product of
his era. He came to power as the worldwide Great Depression was continuing to affect an
already depressed economy in Mexico. The battle for control of the new party and
government culminated in a struggle between Calles and Cardenas in 1935 to 1936.70
The political crisis of 1935 and 1936 represented a crucial point in political
history of Mexico and the PNR/PRI. Calles’ reign of control seemed to be slipping as
Cárdenas came to power amidst more support than the puppet presidencies preceding
him. Cardenas was able to respond to the radicalization of politics and mobilized the
increasing organization of workers while Calles was unable to adjust. These tensions
climaxed in a standoff between the two figures whereby if Cardenas rejected compromise
the party would have to enter new politics of the left. Calles, in turn, could risk
destabilizing his life’s work if he didn’t step down. In a key political maneuver Calles
chose to back down and let Cárdenismo have free range to implement what it chose for
the rest of the sexenio.71
Cárdenas brought the Mexican state far left on the political spectrum most notably
regarding agriculture and land and the relationship with foreign and domestic investors.
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Cardenas supported the progressive articles of the Constitution for labor and land rights,
firmly believing in the need for ‘statism’ and state intervention in the economic and
social workings of society. Calles had pronounced the agrarian reform a failure believing
that the ejido encouraged sloth and that the future lay with private capitalist farming that
was free from labor agitation that could lead to the revoking of investment.72 Cardenas in
contrast worked against the danger of the reliance on foreign capital and believed that
land belonged to those who worked it.73
Cardenas’ leftist leaning goals and desire for conciliation among all classes led to
a significant restructuring of the ruling coalition. Cardenas could not implement his goals
for labor and land policies without a greater support for those policies within the ruling
party. He therefore sought to incorporate the masses into the party structure and did so by
using Calles’ political creation—the Party of the Mexican Revolution. Under Cardenas’
leadership, the PRM was to consist of four equally incorporated sectors of the population,
the peasant sector, labor sector, military sector and the so-called “popular” sector.74 With
this restructuring, Cardenas sought to permanently shift the balance of power in Mexican
politics away from the traditional landed elites to give far greater weight to peasants and
workers.

Four sectors of the PRM
Under the Cárdenas administration, eventually the entire Labor sector was
incorporated in a newly expanded version of the government sponsored
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Confederderación de Trabajadores de México or the CTM. Labor has historically
represented a militant force that, when supported by the government, can be used as a
force to mobilize against a threat from the military sector.75 As such, labor support
represented a necessary source for government legitimacy. Once Cardenas left office and
the labor lost its militant tendencies with the organization of the CTM, the rhetoric of
class struggle was abandoned in favor of an ideology that championed ‘national unity’
and greater and greater collaboration with industry for the good of national
development.”76 Perhaps an oversight of Cárdenas and other leaders working for
cooptation, or perhaps a strategic move on their part, the structure of the CTM did not
foster representation of labor. Instead, the CTM’s continuismo, corruption, poor
management of the leaders, and the decreasing bargaining power of workers increasingly
marginalized the great majority of labor.77
The Peasant sector was incorporated into the state system through the CNC. The
Confederación Nacional Campesina was created for the purpose of balancing the political
power of large landowners with greater political organization of all small landowners and
landless peasants thereby offsetting the patronage provided by the landowners.78 Peasants
were also historically seen as a potential sector from which to mobilize a military coup
d’etat and were increasingly left behind as the state stabilized.79 Leadership of the CNC
was highly hierarchical and since leaders were appointed rather than democratically
elected, they felt less loyal to their peasant constituency than to the government and
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regional politicians who appointed them.80 As recruitment and financial support came
from the top down and the overall organization became more bureaucratized, the CNC
rank and file lost leverage and control in their efforts.81 By 1940, the CNC and the CTM
had become instruments for government control over those sectors rather than of strategic
balancing system that Cardenas had envisioned.82
Cardenas formally incorporated the military sector into the original 4 sectors of
the PRM in support of the old adage—keep your friends close and your enemies closer.
The traditionally top-heavy structure and heavy consumer of government expenditure
organization continued to represent a major threat of a military revolt into the Cardenas
administration. As such, Cardenas sought to institutionalize greater professionalism
within the military and successfully cut the military’s share of the federal budget down
from 25% in 1934 to 19% by 1938.83 Cardenas’ plan was to incorporate the military
within an official political context, putting them on the same level as the other three
organized sectors rather than putting them within a ‘special caste’ as they had been
benefiting under for decades.84 Cardenas removed generals and military officers from
power by strategically moving them one by one to less influential public offices.85 This
strategy was successful in reducing the tendency of the military to intervene covertly and
it eventually led to the disappearance of a military influence in the party as members
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either left the party to join the right wing or were absorbed into other sectors of the
party.86
The “Popular” Sector represented the final pillar of the support base of the young
party. Contrary to the name, this sector does not represent the mass rural poor that the
word ‘popular’ implies. Instead this sector was essentially a federation of middle class
and elite interests made up of skilled workers, white collar employees, low level
government functionaries as well as merchants, middle and large sized landowners and a
variety of social associations.87 These various sectors of the population became formally
organized in the Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Populares, or CNOP.88 The
stucture of the CNOP differed from the CTM and the CNC in that it had no legal
relationship to the government.89 This ‘popular’ sector enjoyed the greatest share of
government benefits and also strengthened its political position outside of the
government, making it far more effective in representing the interest of its constituency
than the other three sectors.
As has become clear in the above presentation of the four sectors of the PRM
support base, those four sectors and their corresponding institutions did not correspond to
key deciders in the ruling coalition but rather tools by which the real ruling coalition
coopted its leaders for the interests of the regime. The real ruling coalition became known
as the Revolutionary Family. This coalition was made up of all the powerful men that
represent the most influential interests in Mexico, including all living past presidents, the
most powerful regional strongmen, the governors of the richest states, the mayor of the
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Distrito Federal, the head of the army, the head of all top banks in Mexico, the wealthiest
industrialists and those who control key industries, the American ambassador, the
secretaries general of the CTM, CNC, and the CNOP and the President of the Senate.90
This revolutionary family was not publicly recognized, they did not meet together at one
time, nor did all members always have equal weight.91 The Family along with the relative
autonomy of the CNOP reflects the high degree of organization and influence within the
ruling party that is afforded to the wealthy.
Cardenas counted the Peasant and Labor sectors as his greatest supporters due to
his policies regarding both. Unions rallied behind Cárdenas in the struggle to help form a
new radical coalition.92 Of course the agraristas had supported the Cárdenas ballot and
expected support from the new ‘center.’ Cardenas made a major shift from Callista policy
on agrarian reform. Cardenas saw the ejidos not as sloth, but rather, as a key institution
for development. However the agrarian reforms under his administration, like those
before his, were hasty and ripe with deficiencies.93 While Cardenas created the
institutions incorporating broad sectors of society into the new Party, due to structural
insufficiencies, the institutions, particularly the CTM and the CNC became institutions
whereby the ruling coalition would assert control over the sectors rather than expand
control for those sectors.
“Rational Socialism” of Cardenismo
The ideologically radical character of the Cardenismo era and its impact on the
consolidation of what would become the PRI regime affords special attention here. More
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so than the revolutionary principles that immediately came out of the core decades of the
Mexican Revolution, the Cárdenas administration represents the most radical leftwardleaning era of modern Mexican history. Cárdenas sought to implement what he referred
to as ‘rational socialism.’ The socialist tendencies of this era were more of a hodgepodge
of ideologies than real hard-core socialist ideology.94
A central mission of this ideology was to “teach people to produce more” and a
quest for cultural cohesion and national integration.95 The educational mission of
‘rational socialism’ sought to establish a public elementary education system where
teachers were to be the forefront of local politics. The weakness of this socialism that
doomed it to failure was that it came from above. It made itself felt through often
unwanted educational projects, seeking to integrate the Indian population into society and
increasing education expenditure to an unprecedented level.96
The consolidation of the CTM as the hegemonic labor organization represented a
formidable task. Cárdenas’ “workers’ democracy” had first to surmount the significant
barriers to hegemony of the CTM, such as the civil service union, requiring membership
by the state as well as peasants groups.97 Cardenas was able to win over the CTM, just as
Calles had won over CROM, through the granting of official subsidies and other benefits
of collaboration.98
Two major crises of industry and labor fell upon the Cárdenas administration as
Cárdenas was consolidating the regime. The challenges, in the railroad and oil industries
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were both reorganized and expropriated under Cardenas. The railways were undercapitalized, over-manned, hit by road competition and heavily indebted to foreigners.99
After strikes were called in 1935 and 1936 the demands were met but the basic economic
problems remained and in 1937 they were nationalized.100 Government management was
ceded to worker’s management in May 1938 but the workers’ initial fiscal success soon
ran into deficit, Avila Camacho would later take back full management by the state.101
In the case of oil, nationalization was the result that shocked the world and
credited Cardenas as a national hero but was not the initial aim of Cárdenas. The oil
industry was nearly wholly foreign owned, smaller and profitable in comparison with the
railway industry. Nationalization was included in the Six Year Plan, however it was
envisioned to be a longer-term goal. A number of factors contributed to his decision to
nationalize oil, including the militancy of oil workers and the imperialist symbol of the
foreign owners and the nationalism surrounding oil. Due to various pressures of political
prestige and the principals of his ‘workers’ democracy’, in 1938 Cárdenas faced three
choices, either to surrender to the will of the foreign investors, a temporary take-over of
the companies’ property or outright expropriation.102 Cárdenas chose the latter despite his
inclination to avoid it. In the end it was the highlight of his presidency and his perceived
machismo incited national solidarity.103
The nationalization had serious consequences for the economy. The peso slipped
and the embittered foreign oil companies rallied a boycott of Mexican business. The
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newly incorporated oil workers were called on to tighten their belts for the national
interest, however from then on, foreign relations were based on respecting the principals
of national sovereignty, non-intervention and self-determination.104
As these industry crises became resolved, the regime entered the tumultuous
decade of the 1940’s in a remarkably strengthened position. The PNR gathered in 1938
for its third national assembly and turned itself into the new PRM, el Partido de la
Revolución Mexicana, encompassing its new corporatist structure.105 The “détente” of
U.S.-Mexico Relations had deteriorated after expropriation of American landholdings,
the railway nationalization and of course the oil nationalization. The U.S. certainly
backed the companies’ boycott and Britain’s response was similar. Perhaps if it were not
for the growing Axis threat, the U.S. would not have gone so easily back to repairing
diplomacy.106
Pan-American conferences in 1939 and 1940 also impacted the relationship
during which the U.S. pledged hemispheric security and warning off belligerent powers
form the “New” World.107 Labor and the CTM opposed taking a side in what they saw as
an imperialist war for markets and pushed instead for a policy of neutrality.
The years 1938 and 1940 saw an important political shift in what some regard as a
clear end to the Revolution. The change in direction came from a decline in presidential
power. As the Cárdenas sexenio came to an end with his refusal to cultivate a successor,
the Cardenista coalition broke down.108 Economic and internal pressures built along with
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added challenges of a large deficit, rising inflation and rising costs of living. The
organized opposition founded the PAN in 1939 by lay Catholics support and from
Monterrey business.109 The regime, with its young consolidation under the Party of the
Revolution, was at a crossroads. Much was unknown as to the long-term strength of
staying power of the coalition built by Cárdenas. Much depended on the ability of the
following administration to further strengthen the existing coalition, with the opportunity
to changes political and ideological direction readily available.
The opportunity was at first seized by Saturnino Cedillo, a Revolution veteran,
governor of San Luis Potosí and Minister of Agriculture. Cedillo was a powerful
regional cacique that was fundamentally at odds at the centralizing mission of the regime.
Cedillo soon grew too strong for the likes of Cárdenas. When Cárdenas arrived in San
Luis Potosí in 1938 to order Cedillo to put down his arms, Cedillo responded by
beginning a rebellion that would cost him his life.110 The government reacted by coopting Cedillo’s support by amending agrarian reform in the region for their favor; the
halfhearted rebellion took to the hills and Cedillo was shot.111 This rebellion is known
among historians as the last old-style military rebellion of the long revolution.
The Cedillo revolt might have represented a serious threat to the stability of the
regime had Cedillo found a way to rally the conservatives against the socialist
administration and the rising threat of communism, however Cedillo was in the end
unsuccessful and the Cárdenas administration with its centralizing mission, prevailed for
the moment. The political and ideological crossroads of the party came to a head in the
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1940 presidential election. Sticking to his ideological guns, Cárdenas refused to follow
the tradition of el tapado and name a successor. The heir apparent was Avila Camacho
who had won support of the military and conservative opponents of Cárdenas. Cardenas
had hoped for free and fair election but the party assured Camacho.112 Camacho stressed
conciliation and unity and rejecting commitment to class struggle.

Political shift
In the wake of the Cedillo revolt and with the rising threat of communism, even if
Cardenas had tried to impose a radical successor the conservative faction of the party
would have rallied against it. The party at the time of the succession was highly divided
as to what direction it should take. Camacho built his campaign outside the party as a
reflection of the weak state of the party. As Secretary of Defense under Cardenas,
Camacho had the support of the military as well as from the state governors and many
local caciques who were interested in maintaining their authority in the face of growing
federal power and easily shifted from a weakening Cardenas to an “opportunistic”
Camacho.113 It was only after Camacho had solidified a broad support base that the party
acquiesced along with the manipulated support of the CNC and CTM. Camacho was
favored due to circumstance more than anything. Camacho sought to align himself with
the anti communist sentiment of the time.114 The election of Camacho would come to
represent a major shift in the ideological makeup of the regime with the pointed decline
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of the left, and the rise of the new right with its virtues of private enterprise, commercialbased agriculture and a renewed inclusion of the church.115
Avila Camacho’s themes of conciliation and unity went hand in hand with the
wartime necessities that were demanded of Mexico as an ally of the U.S..116 Greater
collaboration with the U.S. following Pearl Harbor after which both states joined the
Allied side of the war led to a renewed push for industrialization of Mexico. Economic
growth, exports and agriculture grew during the height of Camacho’s sexenio, before
they worsened by 1945-1946 as inflation grew, leading to greater labor unrest and
nationalistic appeals by the organized left.117 Those in power put greater restraint on labor
and with it the “social truce” of the regime began to break down.118 Far less of a socialleftist than his predecessor, Camacho’s administration claimed to be a moderate supporter
of the ejido system but there was a clear shift during his administration away from the
policies of Cardenismo. During his sexenio, private landowners benefited
disproportionately from the administration’s agriculturally related investments and
policies.119 A major shift occurred under this administration within the CNC towards
clientelistic dependence and internal stratification as those in positions of power sought to
gain from the cooptation offered by the regime120
Camacho’s favored successor was Miguel Alemán, signified the first in a shift to
civilian presidents and the rise of a new technocratic generation of the regime. The left
initially supported what they perceived to be a nationalist candidate only to be
115
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disappointed. A new stricter electoral law was passed in time for the election in hopes of
securing legitimacy of the election and to avoid a repeat of 1940. The new law required
the stricter organization of national parties and closer federal supervision of elections,
enhancing official control over all regions. Additionally, the official party made its final
transformation into the Partido Revolucionario Institutional that differed little from its
predecessor, the PRM, other than a further demotion in the power of the CTM.121
The new Alemán administration was chalked full of young technocrats who, like
the new President, had not been part of the revolution and considered it little more than a
“convenient myth.122” The 6 years of the Alemán administration were key in the
consolidation of the PRI whereby presidential power rose to a new level, the party
solidified its monopoly over the political scene of the country and had the ability to
manipulate and control the mass organizations created by Cárdenas as it willed.123 The
mission of Alemán was to maintain conciliation of classes while avoiding any struggle.124
U.S. policy under the Truman Doctrine and rhetoric of the Cold War both solidified the
nationalistic cause of the PRI and introduced a justification of the need for stability of the
regime, giving it a “democratic” justification for the regime. With the divisions within the
left the PRI was assured relative peace and security to implement its model of industrial
development and capital accumulation.125
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The choice of the revolutionary family, Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, a compromise
candidate, solidified an easy victory. This election in 1952 is considered to be the last of
the open campaigns of the reign of the PRI.126
Ruiz Cortines sought to address the rising problem of a deteriorating legitimacy
and popularity of the ruling elite by firing a number of Alemán era public officials,
thereby distancing himself with the previous administration and also opening political
suffrage to women emphasizing the moral role of women and opening the PRI support
base.127 Additionally he announced numerous anti-corruption and reform-minded
policies, though they never truly came to fruition, they served his goal in strengthening
the public’s support of his administration and the regime as a whole. In a further effort to
highlight the lack of corruption with his administration and to appease the populous over
the rising cost of living, Ruiz Cortines imposed strict fines on monopolies and on the
hoarding of goods and lowered the price of corn and beans.128 In doing so, however, he
made a fundamental shift away from the traditional model of non-intervention in the
economy, creating a fissure in the Party’s alliance with business. Business reacted with
capital flight; the government backed down and returned to favoring business over the
masses in the name of development.
Despite a major long-term loss in the purchasing power of the working class, the
regime was able to use a combination of coercion and co-operation to avoid meeting all
of the demands of would-be defectors. Sometimes co-operation was demanded through
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force, as in the case of the railway strikes of 1958-9.129 Through this display of force, the
regime sent a message that it would not tolerate independent unionism and demanded full
compliance by the leaders of organized labor.130

1958-1970
The following period between 1958 and 1970 was characterized by general
political tranquility thanks to the unquestioned capacity of the state for coercion and cooptation by the consolidated coalition of politicos, técnicos and, to a lesser degree,
military officers.131 The Presidential succession of 1958 came down to another
compromise candidate between the Cardenistas and Alemanistas, Lopez Mateos who
won a strong 90% of the vote.132 López Mateos’ solid victory and high voter turnout was
a clear indication of PRI hegemony over the political structure.
The administration of López Mateo signified a slight step away from the heavyhanded right leaning policies of the previous administrations regarding land, labor and
electoral reform, while continuing along the general path set out by the regime on foreign
policy and the economy. His administration was seconded only to Cardenas in land
reform distribution. This helped tremendously to regain some of the loss of support that
Aleman and others had initiated among peasants, labor and the left. Politically, however,
this move represented a strategic pre-emption over any desire by the radical left to mount
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an anti-establishment campaign and reconfirmed the revolutionary ideology of the
regime, whether or not that confirmation was legitimate or not.133
In 1963, Lopez Mateos made an important electoral reform in what could be seen
as the first step in opening up the PRI to competitive elections and greater prospects for
democracy. After each of the bitter losses of opposition candidates and the relative good
behavior of those candidates, this reform guaranteed a minimum number of five seats in
the Chamber of Deputies to any party winning more than 2.5 per cent of the total nationwide vote.134 This reward was a strategic move on the part of the state to co-opt and make
loyal opponents of the PPS, PARM and the PAN parties.
The ease and stability of the presidential succession in 1964 may be an indication that
this period represented the height of the PRI political machine. The tapado was directed
at Díaz Ordaz, the third Secretary of Gobernación to succeed to the Presidential Chair.135
Immediately after stepping into power, Diaz Ordaz began his rule by force and discipline
by firing any office-holder within the regime that held ‘too much or too little power.’136
During his sexenio, Diaz Ordaz also halted a number of reform movements within the
regime. An anti-business reform of the income-tax code came up during this
administration and the President withdrew the key provisions further deepening the
regime’s intimate connections with the private sector.
While the Diaz Ordaz administration would come to represent a major force in the
suppression of opposition movements among the masses, it began with a reaffirmation of
close state-labor linkages. In 1966 the regime oversaw the creation of a new state-society
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institution, the Congreso del Trabajo (CT) as an overhead link between the CTM, the
Federación de Sindicatos Trabajadores en el Servicio del Estado (FSTSE) and the general
populous. This overture to the masses was created in the midst of a number of ineffective
and unsupportive initiatives for the rural agricultural sector, causing peasants to protest
through marches and land seizures.137 Of course it was the student movement of 1968
that gave the administration the notoriety of violent suppression it is known for today.
1968 Massacre
By the mid 1960’s, social movements outside of the regime as a whole had
become very rare. While many other states in Latin America at this time saw a substantial
rise in the political activism within their university campuses, Mexican student
organizations were basically non-existent beyond the PRI-sponsored student organization
that essentially was a training ground for PRI politicos. Riot police forcefully repressed a
small number of student organizations and movements.138 The growing organization and
structure of the mounting student movement represented the desire of those within the
middle class for democracy and the rejection of hierarchical bureaucratic structures that
characterized the regime. The government continued to arrest and even torture those seen
as agitators in the movement and displayed a surprising ability to track down individuals
who had ever shown radical leftist leanings.139 Correspondingly, the student movement
showed a similarly surprising persistence as the movement continued to grow despite
increased repression.
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The event that would become known as the Tlatelolco Massacre occurred in the
midst of the preparations for the Olympic Games in Mexico. The student movement,
organized under the Comisión Nacional de Huelga (CNH) sought a number of
straightforward demands including the release of all political prisoners, the abolition of
the special riot police, the resignation of the Chief of Police and his deputy and the lifting
of the military occupation of schools.140 These demands were not revolutionary in
ideology but the structure and democratic organization of the movement was quite radical
in comparison to the hierarchal status quo of the day.
On October 6th, an estimated 6,000 supporters of the movement gathered for a
peaceful rally of speeches and proclamations in open Plaza de las Tres Culturas, and the
Tlatelolco apartment complex in Mexico City.141 It was during one of these speeches that
unidentified white-gloved “security agents” opened fire on the helpless crowd.142 There is
much disagreement over the number killed and injured that day by the some 10,000
soldiers but the numbers vary from 50 to 200 killed and perhaps 500 wounded and close
to 1,500 arrested.143
Controversy immediately centered on the question of where to point the blame.
Popular figures for this included, the Secretary of the Gobernacion, Regent of the Federal
District, Secretary of Defense and the President himself, Diaz Ordaz.144 This event
spurred many important questions regarding the regime and Mexican society: was this the
price of political stability?
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Importantly, the event also led to the distancing of the intellectual’s from the
state, and a growing number of them questioning the legitimacy of the regime. The
significance of the events of 1968 represented perhaps a greater challenge to the
maintenance of PRI stability in that it could no longer rely on the same methods of
repression to control the development of opposition movements.145 In 1970 Echeverria
took office calling for an “open dialogue” on a renovation of the PRI and new economic
reforms.146
1970-1990
Several themes characterized the period from 1970 to 1990. The period saw an
increase in population, which thereby created a pressure for job creation and saw the first
major increase in migrant workers to the U.S., which in turn increased tensions with the
U.S..147 This period also experienced a major growth in inequality with an expansion of
upper and middle classes. This period also saw the first beginnings of civil society and an
independent press, which highlighted the growing concern for the election process.148
The first signs of the end of the Mexican economic miracle came during this period. The
epoch of desarrollo estabilizador, with goals to keep prices stable, especially in urban
areas, keeping salaries low and stimulating industry became the policy of the PRI.149 The
weaknesses such as high levels of unemployment, accumulation of debt to abroad, and
overvaluation of the peso became more and more evident during this period as well.150
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Luis Echeverría became president in 1970 after a usual rise from within the
political elite. He became the first president to have never held an elected position.151
The President attempted to save face in the political legitimacy of the regime by declaring
an open dialogue, aperture democrática, in the aftermath of Tlatelolco.152 This attempt
did not represent an attempt to reconfigure the structure of institutions within the regime,
but rather a grand attempt to conjure the memory of Cardenas in a countrywide campaign
of speeches and proclamations.153
Perhaps due to the relative stability the regime felt at this time with its alliance
with business and the elite, or perhaps because the regime saw an opportunity to gain
favor back within the peasant and worker support bases of the party, the Echeverría
administration made a significant shift in its economic policy from the pragmatic stance
of the Diaz Ordaz administration’s desarrollo estabilizador to a popular leaning policy of
desarrollo compartido. This policy sought to improve distribution as well as production
and profit and returned to an almost Cardenista era emphasis on the agrarian sector and
the rural peasants.154 This new policy framework rested on the belief that the state must
intervene to help in the corn-producing sector, thereby cutting out the powerful caciques.
While Echeverría did not fully turn his back to growth-oriented economic policies, or the
party’s alliance with business, his administration passed one other important regulation in
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1973 curbing the actions of foreign enterprise and multinational corporations.155 Tensions
arose between domestic private sector and the government as the state squeezed out
multinational competitors and to create more state owned enterprises (SOE’s).156
There was a slight controversy that changed the traditional method for el tapado
regarding the role of the sitting president and the Party in the final choice on the Party’s
candidate. The party president, Jesus Reyes Haroles declared that the party would release
a basic plan of the government for the next term, a very crafty way of tying the hands of
the future president, before he was chosen.157
The process began with seven tapados all from within his cabinet. The final
destapamiento was a surprise to some, due to his relative lack of a support base, but that
lack of a support base also made him the greatest asset to Echeverria. The PRI as a
political institution had entered its golden era of far-reaching power and influence within
Mexico having developed innovative tools for maintaining stability for the Family. The
President retained the final authority while in office as well as the now-long respected
tradition of the tapado.
In the 1976 election, the PAN was too divided to put forth its own candidate,
making an easy win by the PRI candidate, López Portillo. The election turnout, however,
showed high levels of absenteeism, signifying an important growing sense of apathy
within society towards the aging regime.158
This sense of apathy with the government was in no way lessoned by the
economic situation at the time. The government devalued the peso on August 31, 1976
155

Bethell 371.
Ibid.
157
Bethell 372.
158
Ibid.
156

80

for the first time in nearly fifteen years, partly as a result of months of large-scale capital
flight.159 This move flew in the face of the “Mexican miracle” and the success of
previously popular Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) economic development
policies. The transition period between the two administrations soured further under
threats to lives of the president and rumors of military coup, however all turned out to be
frivolous threats.160
Portillo, weary of the dangerous and high tense situation upon entering office
Portillo chose a risky strategy in an effort to win back support of the opponents of the
regime—electoral reform.
In the effort to appease the mounting political opposition and to regain the
diminishing legitimacy of the regime, evidenced by the high levels of absenteeism of the
1976 election, Portillo developed a three-part reform measure incorporated under the
Federal Law of Political Organizations and Electoral Processes (LOPPEE).161 The first
element was a liberalization of the procedures for party registration granted to any party
that achieved either 1.5 percent of the total national vote or by enrolling at least 65,000
members. The second was an expansion of the Chamber of Deputies to 400, 100 of which
would be elected by proportional representation rather than simple majority allowing
greater room for opposition candidates. The third element was an extension of access to
mass media for the opposition candidates and parties.162 These reforms effectively let
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opposition parties garner approximately 26 percent of the seats in the lower house and
were guaranteed a minimum of one-quarter of all the seats.163
In 1979 the country struck oil, a savior to a political economy that was nearly at a
standstill as policies of ISI had begun to slowly lose favor and the confrontational
situation of the previous administration with the business sector had come to a head. The
administration heeded the warning from the left observing the danger of oil dependency
vowing to keep exports to 1.25 million barrels per day.164 However, as the coordinated
efforts of OPEC countries helped to drive the prices of oil up, exports grew and so did oil
earnings. In this “petrolization,” oil earnings grew from $311 million in 1976 to nearly
$14 billion by 1981, while non-oil exports such as agricultural commodities declined.165
With the extraordinary growth in the GDP afforded by the oil boom, the Portillo
administration took the opportunity to make a number of important shifts in its domestic
economic policies. For one, it attempted to use its extra revenue to return to an emphasis
of its agricultural sector. It created the Sistema Alimentario Mexicano, or SAM, to
channel funds into the production and consumption of agriculture commodities with the
goal of becoming self-sufficient in food production.166 The program met with success
during the favorable weather of 1981, only to fall precipitously in the following drought
years.
Challenges that arose from these policies included a serious crisis in the balance
of trade. The peso became artificially strong, while the U.S. was in recession, which
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created greater incentives for wealthy Mexicans to travel and spend abroad. Border
industries such as maquiladoras lost sales and tourism within Mexico stagnated.167
As students of economic development know, the 1980’s saw the downfall of the
popular ISI strategies of development with the collapse of the exorbitant debts throughout
Latin America. Mexico not only ended its exceptionalism in the region, but also was the
first in the region to wave the white flag. The government incurred higher and higher
debts from Portillo’s strategy of high state-investment-led growth. From the 1970s to
1981 the government’s deficit doubled as a percent of GDP to 14 percent then increased
to 18 percent in 1982 leaving the government with only one option, to borrow more
raising the national debt to $80 billion by 1982.168 The once stable inflation was in turn
driven up to 100 per cent thereby reducing the purchasing power of the workers.
Whereas a limited yet substantial use of corruption by those who held public
office had always presumably taken advantage of, Portillo and his cronies brought
corruption to a new level. His administration made a far more ostentatious show of the
practice in public scenes, gambling high stakes without blinking an eye. At a time of
economic hardship for the majority within Mexico, this show of corruption was a poor
choice politically for the regime.
Before leaving office, Portillo deflated the peso in February 1982. The peso
plummeted, and inflation grew, followed by further devaluation in August when it
announced that it would likely not be able to meet its debt obligations. This crisis has
become known as the Tequila Crisis. The international community responded by hastily
formulating an emergency relief plan in order to avoid default. In September, Portillo
167
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declared state expropriation of privately owned banks.169 The left applauded this
nationalization while the right criticized it. These changes resulted in a final rupture of
the long-time alliance of the state with the private sector, leading the private sector to
organize amongst itself in the coming decades.
Portillo chose a candidate with weak connections to the PRI who had served in his
Budget and Planning office, Miguel de la Madrid. A close personal friend and Harvard
educated candidate won with 75% of the vote.170 In breaking with what he criticized as
“financial populism” of the previous administrations, De La Madrid accepted the
conditions of the IMF for renegotiation of the debt, lifted price controls and deflated the
peso again, the value fell to around 150 per dollar, all as an attempt to restore confidence
within the international community.171
In January of 1983, reversing the previous policy of Portillo, De la Madrid sent a
bill to Congress that would authorize the sale of 34 per cent ownership of the newly
nationalized banks to private investors, in an attempt to restore the party’s alliance
between the state, the private sector and the foreign sector.172
The austerity measures implemented by De la Madrid were ‘obligatory’ as he had
stated while in reality they appeared to be obligatory mostly for the working class. These
classes alone had to deal with the inflation hovering between 70 and 90 per cent while
only gaining 25 percent wage increases and suffered further after the removal of price
ceilings and public subsidies.173 This created a serious strain between labor and the state.
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Threats to strike were only averted by “postponement of discussions” rather than
settlement of issues.
By attempting to reconsolidate the ruling coalition, the regime ran the risk of
pushing the state-labor and middle class tensions to the brink. In response to this rising
danger, the administration initiated a series of investigations in their so-called ‘moral
renovation’ campaign. One such investigation was the case against Jorge Diaz Serrano,
the former president’s associate and head of Pemex for alleged participation in a fraud.174
This was a risky move that could also serve to further alienate key sectors of the ruling
‘coalition.’
This ‘moral renovation,’ however, appeared merely as propaganda in light of the
new situation regarding the narcotics trade between the U.S. and Mexico. After a U.S.
drug enforcement agent was found murdered in 1985, allegations over cover-ups and
corruption within the Mexican police force put a damper over the diplomatic relations.175
Thus began the now decades long battle between U.S.-Mexican efforts to curb the drug
trade.176
Relatedly, the immigration saga that the U.S. and Mexican authorities continue to
quibble over today began during this decade. It began with the Simpson-Rodino Bill
signed into law under President Ronald Reagan in November 1986. This law created
economic sanctions against employers in the U.S. who knowingly hired illegal aliens and
an amnesty for undocumented workers who could prove continuous residence in the U.S.
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since January 1982.177 With numerous loopholes and below expectation numbers of
applications for amnesty the two provisions of the bill made little difference in the
numbers migrating to the U.S. that would increase from 3 million to 4 to 5 million by the
early 1990s.178
Disaster struck Mexico City on September 19th, 1985, a 7.3 magnitude earthquake
destroyed buildings all over the city, the worst of which hit the old downtown area.179
Beyond the nearly 100,000 left homeless and estimated $4 billion of damages left in its
wake, the earthquake sparked a political fall-out. In the hours, days and weeks following
the earthquake the citizens of Mexico City responded by spontaneously rising to the
occasion with an outpouring of voluntary aid of all kinds in a previously unheard of
emergence of “civil society.” In comparison, many considered the governments’ response
to the catastrophe as too little, too late. From evidence of non-compliance to construction
codes within many, to a rising demand for the election rather than presidential
appointment of the Federal District’s regent, the government was faced with a major
legitimacy crisis.180
In contrast to the decades long reliance on state-led growth De la Madrid
undertook an unprecedented overhaul of Mexico’s state-owned enterprises.181 Greater
liberalization of the economy was achieved through a general ‘opening up’ of the
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economy and from joining the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) creating
a reduction of barriers to imports.
The period beginning in 1984 represented a significant shift in the strategies,
support base and national presence for the long-time ‘loyal opposition’ the PAN. Riots
broke out in response to the contested results of PRI victories in municipal elections in
the state of Coahuila. At least two dead and roughly 35 wounded, this event marked the
first time since the 1968 massacre of the government firing upon protestors.182 This event
sparked a growth of militancy and a general impatience for the traditional cooperation of
the PAN with PRI dominated elections. The PAN at this time also saw a large growth in
its support among the business community. The year 1984 was the first time that business
leaders not only donated money to the party but also ran for public office under the
opposition party.183
Under heavy pressures in the wake of a major earthquake as well as ongoing
economic crises, de la Madrid undertook a new electoral law. This 1986 electoral code
provided 6 provisions including the significant measure for the winning or majority party
to never obtain more than 70 percent of the seats in the lower chamber. The PRI’s
proportional representation was significantly reduced from its recent range from 83
percent to 74 percent.184 Additionally, only three hundred deputies would now be elected
by a relative majority based on individual congressional districts, while those based on
proportional percentages of their total national vote were increased from 100 to 200
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increasing the total number of seats from 400 to 500.185 Furthermore, opposition parties
may obtain 40 percent of the seats without winning a single majority district, the majority
winning party was now to retain a simply majority in the entire chamber and half the
Senate is to be renewed triennially instead of the entire chamber every six years.186
The Presidential succession of 1988 represented a move away from tradition in
three ways. The Presidency had lost its overwhelming dominance over the past years
largely thanks to the economic crises. Dissident faction within the PRI emerged that were
insisting on opening the process of presidential succession. The international media was
also paying unprecedented attention to the succession.187 The dissident faction that had
formed a temporary coalition in the campaign for Cárdenas formed the new opposition
party, the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) that subsequently consolidated its
position as the third strongest national party.188 This election also gave greater strength to
the power of the Chamber of Deputies as the opposition was for the first time elected to
nearly half the seats.
At this time the PRI used a new method by which party candidates for president
could publically compete for the party candidacy while also reinvigorate Party presence
more publically. New Compareciencias were public appearances where the PRI
candidates gave formal presentations to various assemblies of PRI notables on their
visions for the nation’s future. This represented an unprecedented public exposure of
what had so long been a private destapado. The question remained as to whether it was a
sign of real ‘democratization’ or merely a cosmetic change.
185
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In regard to the economic turmoil at the time, the 1988 election of Carlos Salinas
ensured that the importance of privatization and the economic liberalism begun by De la
Madrid would continue. Salinas sought develop conditions for international competition
through massive privatization, essentially rolling back the decades of import substitution
industrialization and state-led development. After selling many state owned enterprises
and cutting back tariffs, the administration was able to reverse the much-despised last
move by Lopez Portillo by selling off the banks it had nationalized a decade earlier.189 In
a process that many have criticized as the highest form of crony capitalism, 1,155 of the
firms the state had owned in 1987 was cut to a mere 286 by 1992, an 80 percent drop.190
Among these, included Teléfonos de México and Mexicana airlines, both of which had
enjoyed a full or nearly full monopoly over their respective industries were sold off at the
fraction of their value.
The year 1988 saw a significant and long-awaited elite splitting ending with the
creation of a new left-wing opposition party, the PRD. Sparked by leftist Cuauhtémoc
Cárdenas, he and his allies disagreed with De la Madrid’s economic policies, specifically
the government’s austerity reforms under the IMF stabilization package, trade
liberalization and privatization of state-owned enterprises. Cárdenas, in contrast,
continued to have faith in the ISI model of development and the need to maintain an
active nationalist state.191 The split that occurred in 1988 was also a reaction to the
narrowing of career opportunities within the PRI and the increasingly closed ruling elite.
189

Camp 278.
Camp 279.
191
Magaloni, Beatriz. "The Demise of Mexico's One-Party Dominant Regime: Elite
Choices and the Masses in the Establishment of Democracy." The Third Wave of
Democratization in Latin America: Advances and Setbacks. Ed. Frances Hagopian and
Ed. Scott P. Mainwaring. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 128. Print.
190

89

The Cardenistas split with the party officially at a party assembly in 1987 after forming
the opposition group the Corriente Democrática.

Mexico’s Transition: 1990s- Present
The elections of 1988 and 1991 underwent important shifts in both PRI support
within society and PRI tolerance of opposition. The 1988 election whereby PRI candidate
Salinas won with a mere 51 percent of the vote and the newcomer Cárdenas won fully 31
percent of the national vote according to official numbers was significant for two reasons.
First, the 1986 reform seemed to suggest the increased importance of pluralism whereby
the PRI would have to negotiate with the opposition in order to gain support for the
passage of legislation. Second, the high levels of abstention seen the 1982 election
seemed to have reversed itself in preference for not the long loyal PRI opposition party,
the PAN, but for the Democratic Current, the PRD. The election of 1991, the PRI, in
contrast to 1988, claimed 61.4 percent of the vote and reclaimed its majority status,
essentially questioning the permanence of the strength of the opposition and growth of
plurality in governance.
The most substantial institutional reforms occurred in two stages during the
1990’s. The first stage of reforms, 1990 to 1993, represented piecemeal electoral reforms
negotiated by a bipartisan coalition between the PRI and PAN. In 1990, Salinas conceded
to the PAN in exchange for its support in the Lower Chamber of Deputies of the
President’s economic agenda.192 These economic reforms were far reaching enough to
require support outside the PRI. In response to the weakening economy and pressures
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from international financial institutions, Salinas sought to privatize the banking system
and to restructure the property rights that required constitutional amendments. As part of
the compromise with the PAN, the reform created the federal Electoral Tribunal, though
the government retained control of its board.193 It was later in 1993 that further reforms
granted the Federal Electoral Institute the authority to certify electoral results and the
creation of the Sala de Segunda Instancia for appeals whose decisions could not be
appealed by any other authority.194
A subtler, non-official shift occurred during this time outside official reforms. The
PRI, for the first time, began making greater allowances for local PAN victories during
the Salinas administration in further rewards for the acquiescence to the electoral fraud of
1988. Further, new concertacesiones were carried out—post-electoral bargains among
the PAN’s leadership in exchange for support and continued ‘legitimacy’ of the
regime.195 Meanwhile the PRD who had experienced increasing political persecution
openly opposed the legitimacy of the Salinas regime and the direction of the economic
policy.
Discontent returned and with vengeance sparking the second wave of reforms
from 1994 to 1996 as a result of domestic crises and newly urgent international pressure.
The year 1994 is significant for two reasons. Going into effect January 1, 1994, the North
American Free Trade Agreement made by Mexico, the United States and Canada, called
for the phasing out of the longstanding trade barriers between the three nations. After
Salinas pushed it through the opposition, Salinas was hit by accusations of corruption
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despite the argument by the opposition that the agreement would bring an even deeper
gap between the rich and the poor of Mexico. A major uprising in the state of Chiapas
arose in response to this crisis of political disagreement. The Zapatista Army of the
National Liberation (EZLN), a revolutionary leftist group issued a declaration of war on
what they say as an illegitimate federal government.196 These domestic and international
crises were what pushed the PRI to finally relinquish full control of the electoral process
in the second stage of reforms.
In an effort to calm the chaotic political atmosphere created by the uprising in
January before the presidential elections in June, the administration passed another set of
reforms. These reforms most notably granted independence to the Federal Election
Institute. Also of significance, the political negotiations that came in the wake of the
Chiapas revolt were the first to include the PRD.
The reform in 1994 created six consejeros ciudadanos, or citizen councilors of a
10-person board to oversee the electoral process, the president of which was to be the
Interior Minister (Secretario de Gobernación). Elected by a two-thirds vote in the Lower
Chamber, the PRD, PRI and the PAN each had the right to propose two councilors and
four members of Congress, two from the PRI and two from opposition parties.197
Two additional crises—the 1994 Peso Crisis and the assassination of PRI
candidate, Luis Donaldo Colosio, further contributed to the realization that something
had to change within the system. The PRI, which, along with most economic experts at
the time, had not seen the economic crisis looming and had had high hopes for the

196
197

Camp 280.
Magaloni 168.
92

recovery and future prosperity of the Mexican economy and the regime thanks to what
they saw as a well balanced economic plan implemented under Salinas.198
The 1994 elections were highly significant for a number of reasons. The gravity
of the political and economic scene surrounding the crises alone were enough to signal a
major turning point for the PRI, regardless of the reforms and the results. The tensions
also sparked unprecedented international coverage of the elections. Within Mexico itself,
there was an unprecedented turnout on Election Day of 78 percent. Winning roughly 50
percent of the vote, the PRI enjoyed the benefits of its reforms as most Mexican
reportedly believed the elections to be more or less credible, adding newfound legitimacy
to the electoral process.199 Importantly the PRI’s advantage of media access represented
further evidence of the inequality of political access that remained in the system.
The final stage of the electoral reform came in 1996. The 1996 reform solidified
the 1994 reform by granting the IFE the power to monitor and sanction campaign
expenditures, level campaign financing and media access and to incorporate the Federal
Electoral Tribunal into the judicial branch and allow for judicial review of electoral
laws.200 This broadening of both the electoral institution and the judicial branch
importantly weakened the control of the PRI and represented another major step towards
a democratic system of checks and balances.
Even with these expansive reforms, it remained unclear as to whether elections in
Mexico could ever truly reflect the votes of all Mexicans fairly. Prior to the 2000 election
it is reported that two-fifths of Mexicans believed the elections would be unfair in some
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way.201 Mexico’s unprecedented election of the first opposition candidate in more than
70 years reflected a much-altered system with the election of Vicente Fox.
Interestingly, Roderic Camp cites the most influential long-term element in the
PAN victory as the shift in the comparative ideological perception of the PRI and the
PAN. While the PRI was traditionally considered to be a center-right party, the PAN,
representative of its Catholic and business foundation, has been traditionally considered
to be a right of center party. There has been, according to Camp, a shift whereby the PAN
is now identified as the party of the center while the PRI has evolved into the party right
of center.202
Vincente Fox was elected with 42 percent of the national vote.203 With the high
levels of mobilization seen in the elections of 1996, the millennial election reflected an
emotional national drive to unseat the PRI from power perhaps more than a newfound
consensus of the PAN political agenda. Fox was followed by PRI candidate Francisco
Labastida with 36 per cent and Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas of the PRD with 17% of the
national vote.204 Elected on a number of many unrealistic platform goals such as giving
every Mexican family a Volkswagen Beetle and a small store and that he could solve the
Chiapas conflict in 15 minutes, in retrospect continued support of the PAN might not be
sustainable. However Fox did make a number of important changes such as the creation
of the Federal Investigation Agency (AFI) for the purpose of fighting federal crimes,
largely in response to drug cartel violence. Fox also is credited with the creation of the
Federal Law of Transparency and Access to Public Government Information with the
201
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purpose of providing citizens with access to information to hold government
accountable.205
A number of other policies of the Fox administration stand out. Fox is credited
with being the first President to make a concerted effort to reach an agreement with the
U.S. regarding immigration, however the September 11th attacks disrupted the process.
Furthermore Fox made a risky move in his disapproval of the U.S. invasion of Iraq,
though justified in retrospect, as Mexico’s number one trade partner, it was a bold move
for the first opposition administration to test the waters for future non-PRI U.S.-Mexico
relations.206
Lastly, an interesting mission of the administration, the creation and construction
of the José Vasconcelos Library highlights some of the potential weaknesses of the first
opposition administration. After inaugurating the massive new library in May of 2006,
the library closed within the year due to defects in construction.207 Such a failure may be
a reflection of the weakness of the new regimes’ bureaucratic apparatus.
The 2006 election reflected a continued support of the PAN and an increased
support of the PRD. With 58% of the vote, Felipe Calderon’s win was hotly contested by
the PRD.208 In the past six years as President, Calderon has become famous for his selfproclaimed war on drugs in a full-scale offensive against the drug cartels that had by
2006 become a serious threat to the State. More than 34,000 Mexicans have since been
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killed as part of the violence associated with this offensive.209 Calderon has repeatedly
criticized the United States in its treatments of illegal immigrants while as staunch PAN
conservative represented a committed U.S. ally supporting the free flow of commerce and
labor with the U.S. in the face of rising populism elsewhere in Latin America.210 In the
face of heightened criticisms of the failures of his war on the drug cartels, Calderon
enters the final months of his six-year term with a surprising 52 per cent approval rate.211
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Condition of the State Today
Mexico’s recent evolution toward a more democratic state cannot be understood
without a brief elaboration on the current situation of the state today. Economically,
Mexico is perhaps now in the strongest position it has been in nearly four decades.
Having paid back its loans and fulfilled the requirements under the structural adjustment
programs of the 1990s ahead of schedule, Mexico enters the second decade of the
millennium in a newly strengthened position. Outside the sphere of economics, however,
the strength of the state is far less certain.
In order to answer the central questions of this thesis regarding the impact and
causes of the rise in violence in Mexico and the corresponding shift to democracy in the
past two decades, a closer examination of the facts on the ground is necessary. Statistical
reports regarding the violence vary, and depict a broad range of figures. It would take a
far lengthier presentation to analyze the precise data on drug related violence. In the
appendices, I present three tables that show the degree of complexity and size of the
problem of ongoing violence in Mexico.
Table 1 is a chart taken from the news source, La Reforma showing a
conservative estimate of drug related homicides since 2001. The dramatic increase of
drug related homicides is shown to range from a low of 1,080 deaths in 2001; to 2,120 in
2006; 5,153 in 2008; 6,587 in 2009 and 5,775 in the first half of 2010.1
Tables 2 and 3 depict longer-term trends of all homicides in Mexico. Both show
violence skyrocketing in 2006 corresponding with Calderon’s announcement of his new
1
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war to eradicate the drug cartels. Table 2 is a chart released by the Mexican government
of all homicides reported from January 1997 to October 2010. Table 3 shows a report of
all homicides reported from January 1979 to October 2010. It shows that the year 2010
reported the highest homicide rate in recent history. Though overall homicides in Tables
2 and 3 depict a slow decline in the decades before 2006, Table 1 figures indicate that
drug related violence was slowly increasing even before the 2006 announcement. The
Tables also includes a number of inconsistencies.
Independent researchers have found a number of inconsistencies within official
numbers of homicide cases. 2 For instance claiming that the official numbers of some
states count the number of police reports submitted rather than of individual body counts
within each report.3 Table 2 and 3 show that Mexico had seen a long-term decline in the
overall homicide rate until the official declaration of the Calderon’s war on drugs in
2006. Since then the incidences of drug related homicides have increased precipitously
depicting the failures of the policy and an urgent need for change.
This recent increase in violence was what sparked the debate in 2008 and 2009 as
to the question of Mexico becoming a failed state. A claim was made in 2008 by the U.S.
Joint Forces Command argued that Mexico could potentially face rapid and sudden
collapse in the future because the government, its politicians, police and judicial
infrastructure were under assault by criminal gangs and drug cartels and thereby
incapable of maintaining state security and stability.4 While experts on the subject have
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largely disproved this claim, the challenges that surround the issues raised by the claim
remain central to the current challenges to the strength of the Mexican state today. The
government of Mexico continues to maintain that, “by all significant measure, Mexico
has a functioning state” in that “it provides education, health, security and other
government services to millions of people.”5 But while the Mexican state may not be on
the verge of collapsing, public fear driven by the failure of the current administration to
improve the situation necessitate greater change.
The influence and infiltration of drug trafficking organizations and criminal gangs
into governmental institutions highlight the precipice upon which state stability is
balancing. Observers of the situation note that drug trafficking organizations are not
seeking to take down the state but rather to subvert it. Since the organizations are
interested in maintaining their respective hegemony over key trafficking routes, they rely
on corrupt government officials and law enforcement.
Perhaps the greatest challenge in the fight against the drug cartels is the issue of
corruption. Much of the profit from the trafficking of drugs is used in the pursuit of the
collusion of officials. Efforts have only begun to address this major challenge. The
Calderon administration has highlighted victories in the fight against corruption, such as
the largest-ever arrest of politicians and senior officials in Calderon’s home state of
Michoacán. Throughout the country, the continued call for the firing of top officials such
as the Security Secretary García Luna and an overall cleanup of the political system by
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the population at large highlight the need for a deeper cleanse of the bureaucratic and
police enforcement agencies.6
In terms of the public perception of the ongoing violence, research institutes on
the subject argue that much of the public discontent and desperation of the situation
revolves around the lack of transparency regarding the war for cartel eradication. A report
organized by University of San Diego’s Trans Border Institute quotes Maria Marván
Laborde of the Instituto Federal de Acceso a la Información (IFAI) stating, “I am
convinced that if there was a policy of transparency and access to public safety
information, there would be greater confidence from society in this fight against drug
trafficking and in the efforts on which this administration has embarked.”7 Unfortunately
the disclosure of such information, or even openness regarding the flaws in the reporting
of violence, would undermine the effectiveness of the administrations’ efforts. Therefore
such transparency is unlikely to emerge under the current administration.
Academics are not the only ones calling for greater transparency. May of 2011
saw the world’s first and perhaps largest demonstration protesting the drug war. In a four
day march an estimated 90,000 protesters called on the Calderon administration to make
far-reaching changes in Mexico’s security policy and an end to the war on drugs that had
taken the lives of so many loved-ones in a ‘citizen’s pact.’ The pact includes six
demands: “1) Resolution of the assassinations and disappearances and the naming of
victims; 2) An end to the war strategy and adoption of a “citizen security” strategy; 3)
Effective measures against corruption and impunity; 4) A focused attack on the economic
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roots and criminal revenue streams, including money laundering; 5) Immediate attention
to the plight of youth and effective actions to rebuild a broken society, including
reorienting the budget to education, health, culture and employment; 6) Participatory
democracy.”8 These demands, along with a rise in organization of civil society, represent
a new wave of mobilization against the status quo structure of policy making. From such
mobilization, it is clear that Mexicans today are becoming fed up with ineffective policies
of the PAN and are beginning to recognize that a democratic electoral system does not
ensure an effective government.
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Chapter 4: Concluding Analysis
This section addresses the core puzzle examined in this thesis and it is driven by
the following question: How does the tradeoff between the maintenance of state stability
and the development of competitive representation affect the movement toward
establishing democracies? I begin by identifying the effect(s) the PRI and Mexico’s party
system have had on the stability and development of the state. I focus on the challenges a
considerable effort toward democratization would have generated, and how the PRI used
them to justify its hegemonic rule. I then discuss the changes that ensued between 1961
and 1994 and how they affected the transition to democracy. Thereafter, I address the
condition of the Mexican state today. Specifically, I answer the following question: Do
the security challenges that have arisen since the year 2000 represent evidence that
transitions to democracy often result in a fall in state stability or vulnerability? Based on
the last analysis, I close with a discussion of the stability-democratization trade-off. I
concentrate on the transition from one-party systems to a multiple party system; how
different types of party systems affect the tradeoff; and how this study may challenge or
substantiate conclusions presented in other state stability and democracy literature.

Analysis of the Case Study
The processes of state development and democracy development reflect a set of
interconnected needs. Stein Rokkan tells us that as the state develops, a greater portion of
society is brought into the system. As the state apparatus and institutions grow, the state
requires greater amounts of funding, which requires an extraction of resources and
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funding from society at large. In order to justify greater amounts of funding in the form
of taxation, the state must increase benefits or public goods to society. The core of
democratization requires growth in both participation and contestation in government.1
Giovanni Sartori informs us that factions are inevitable in the development of the state
and the relative tolerance of opposition parties and plurality in governance is a major
influence in state and democracy development.2 Public goods, however, are also ranked
hierarchically whereby state security is always valued above rule of law, participation in
the political system and redistributive services. 3 In short, the process of democratization
is dependent on the relative strength and development of the state for providing state and
human security; moreover the nature and structure of the parties and party systems can
influence the type of interdependence that ensues.
Mexico forces analysts to try to unravel the following dilemma: How does a state
create and maintain stability while it opens itself to democracy? The core reason for
Mexico’s exceptionality was the relative politicized nature of society at large during the
founding of the PRI. The surprisingly progressive ideology of the 1917 Constitution and
the comparatively high mobilization of society at the end of the Revolution beg the
posing of two questions: Why was the expansion of participation and contestation in 20th
century delayed in Mexico? What factors might have pushed for a faster democratization
of Mexico?
1. Preference for Order and Stability
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The Mexican state has been a product of its own experience with insecurity. Key
events such as the 1845-48 war with the United Stets, the invasion by the French in the
1860’s, the Era of Anarchy that preceded Porfiriato, and the chaos of the Revolutionary
period all created a society with a strong preference for order and stability over freedom.
The state responded to these experiences by relying on various systems of control. It was
the experience of anarchy of the previous eras that had led to tolerance for the supreme
dictatorship of the Diaz regime.
Both the Era of Anarchy leading up to Porfirato and the chaos of the Revolution
led to a heightened preference for order and stability over freedom and participation in
Mexican society. This preference was the result of bitterness regarding Mexico’s
vulnerability to foreign intervention and the incapacity of Mexico’s elites to compromise
ideologically as is necessary in any young state that strives to unify.
2. Aversion to Perpetual Rule of Presidents and Closed Oligarchies
While Mexico’s experience with instability created a preference for stability,
Mexico’s experience under Porfirato ingrained an additional sentiment—abhorrence of
one-man rule and closed oligarchies characterized by the Diaz dictatorship. This loathing
would become a leading factor in the development of the PRI’s hegemonic party rule.
The “amificación” and pacification of the elite did not represent the consolidation and
compromise needed in the wake of the deep divides that remained from the LiberalConservative battles following independence. This consolidation simply was put on hold
under the supreme rule of Diaz.
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The development of stateness under Porfirato highlights Charles Tilly’s argument
regarding the linkage between high levels of ‘stateness’ with high propensity for revolt.4
The key determinant that pushed the Diaz regime out was not the autonomy he granted to
key interests but rather the exclusion of elites from participating in his administration.
The legacy of hostility toward the perpetual rule of one leader, and the tight-knit
cronyism with no room for broader political inclusion of elites, would become paramount
in the unique regime that followed the revolution—one that was built on the value of no
reelection and the necessity of a strong coalition among a wide spectrum of economic and
political elite.
3. Early Politicization of Society
A politicized society is necessary for the rise of a party system within the state.5
Low levels of overall mobilization during state building generally correspond to greater
instances of success in consolidating the needed institutional base on which to enter later
phases of participation.6 The experiences of Porfirato and the Revolution created a
politicized society in Mexico that necessitated the creation of a regime capable of
absorbing the newly politically active society.
The early experience with overt, repressive, authoritarian rule resulted in two
interrelated and highly influential effects. The first was the ideological mobilization that
surrounded the Revolution. The 1917 Constitution reflected the demands of multiple
sectors. It extended broad rights to labor, the press and other underrepresented groups,
4
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and laid the groundwork for land reform. Yet, much in the same way that Diaz, upon
gaining power, moved away from his ‘liberal’ ideology and towards a far more
conservative basis of rule, the evolution of the PRI underwent a similar shift.
Second, as a result of the newly acquired ideology articulated in the 1917
Constitution, the founders of the PRI had a guideline to help them mobilize and coopt key
sectors of Mexican society. The social, economic and political grievances of the
Revolution and the Articles of the 1917 Constitution that came out of them became not
the strict rules that the regime would need to follow but guidelines for the minimal public
goods that the society expected of the state. It was these minimal public goods—land
reform, bargaining power of labor groups, certain state subsidies and preferences for
national business—that became the basis under which the rising political elite was able to
coerce the Peasant and Labor sectors and perpetuate their power. The politicization of
Mexican society was therefore perhaps one of the most significant influences in the
creation of a system that would provide the minimal requisites of the lower classes while
protecting and furthering the interests of the wealthy classes.

The PRI Machine
What were the most important aspects of society at the founding of the PRI
system and throughout the rest of the century that would have presented challenges to the
democratization process? What were the most important aspects of the PRI state system
that justified the perpetuation of its hegemonic rule? Which of the themes existing in the
period prior to the establishment of the PRI can be said to have delayed democratization?
Where does stability come in? Answers to these questions I present below.
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A society that is sensitive to, and activated by, political action is “politicized”.
The politicization of Mexican society in the closing years of the Revolution came as a
major challenge for the consolidation of the PRI system. The challenge lay in the careful
pacification of a strong and mobilized labor and peasant sector that showed signs of
organizational potential, while allowing continued and extensive freedom to protect the
interests of the political-economic elite of Mexico. A number of conditions and
developments helped achieved the necessary balance:
1)

The breadth of the ideological spectrum that remained within the party
system despite the party’s outward incongruity,

2)

The periodic policy concessions to both radical wings of the party and
importantly,

3)

The lack of overtly repressive methods for perpetuation of party control
of the system,

4)

The all-encompassing desire for economic progress that both appealed
to all sectors of the PRI base and resulted in the “Mexican Miracle,” but
above all,

5)

The party’s unique corporatist structure allowed the regime to control
society’s exit and voice options while proclaiming a policy of inclusion.

One-party systems can only emerge after the establishment of suitably politicized
society and after the party becomes a player in the world arena.7 As a result of the
politicization of Mexico’s society by the end of the Revolution, it became ripe for the
establishment of both a party system and opposition actors. Mexican society had already
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been awakened politically in such a way that the state had to count all elements as
relevant actors in the polity—and what’s more that inclusion could be useful to maintain
stability.8
While the Qurétaro Pact, which secured elite cooperation, remained central to PRI
stability for the remainder of the century, it was the ideological inclusiveness of the PRI
that perpetuated and enhanced the support and legitimacy of the Party. The progressive
ideology of the 1917 Constitution, and especially the ideological mission of Cardenismo,
served as a key rallying point for the mass support of the party. It was the ideological
pendulum that existed in the evolving presidential successions that ensured the stability
of the system and broad based support for the party. Although Cardenismo made strides
in winning the support of the designated Labor and Peasant base of the party, the
industrial capitalist policies of Alemanistas guaranteed support from the private sector
base of the party.
If one single sexenio can be credited with creating the methods and institutional
basis for longevity and ideological flexibility, it was Lazaro Cardenas’s. Cardenas single
handedly created the institutional underpinnings from which the party machine would
establish its clientalistic practices. He established the precedence for ideological plurality
within the party under which both leftist Cardenistas, and later on, rightist Alemanistas
would benefit. The election of Cardenas brought major labor and peasant support into the
party and set in motion the exceptional openness within the party.9 Although the backlash
to his progressive ‘rational socialism’ translated into a series of more radical pro-industry
8
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presidencies, it also enabled leftist factions to remain within the party. Without the
progressive sexenio of Cardenas, the weakening support of labor in the wake of Calles’
Maximato, the progressive faction and support in the party might never have returned to a
position of power in the presidential chair.
In addition, stability and longevity were achieved through a number of key policy
concessions to would-be defectors from the PRI. The most notable example of this
occurred under the Cardenas administration. Nationalization of oil served as a rallying
point for nationalism and reconciliation of classes under the Cardenas administration.
Nationalism is a key aim of state builders, especially for latecomers to development that
revert to one-party or military regimes, such as Mexico.10 The second most significant
policy concessions were the periodic land redistribution policies. While Cardenas and
Cortines were substantially more active in implementing land reform than all other
administrations, every administration, regardless of ideological views, used periodic land
redistribution and ejido development as a way of appeasing the grievances of the
landless, rural poor.
The continued drive for economic development and general success with it that
permeated the agendas of literally all PRI sexenios, provided justification for the
perpetuation of the regime. Since the PRI was reliant on support from the industrial
sector, policies boosting the development of key industries were good for the PRI’s allies
in the business sector. Thanks to Cardenas’ “rational socialism,” economic progress was
“Perhaps the policy must exit first, perhaps unification has to precede party “partition,”
and perhaps this is the condition that makes parties a subdivision compatible with unity
rather than a division that disrupts it. This supported by the experience of most of the
developing societies bent upon constructing a national identity and integration, which
have quickly resorted to the single party or to military rule, and in either case to
banishing organized dissent, that is, opposition.” See, Sartori 16-7.
10
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good for both the socialist-leaning sectors of society as well as hardline capitalists.
Policies could periodically favor industry and landless farmers in order to retain the
support of each. While ‘rational socialism’ was meant to redistribute wealth to the
poorest Mexicans, it also emphasized the need for enhance the ways the poor contributed
to development. The party retained a careful balance in framing its policies for each
sector of its support.
The final two conditions that helped contribute to the longevity and stability of
the system revolved around the two exceptional characteristics of the PRI -- the specific
loyalty and tolerance of the opposition actors and the lack of need for the oppressive tools
characteristic of most authoritarian regimes.
The PRI’s unique lack of need for repressive tools was thanks to the broad
effectiveness of alternative methods for coopting all sectors of society into remaining
within the system. The PRI succeeded in this endeavor, with few exceptions, due to its
adept combination of limiting the exit and voice options available to would-be
defectors.11
It limited exit options in selective obligatory institutional memberships for certain
sectors—the CTM and the CNC. In the direct, hierarchical and highly organized
incorporation of broad sectors of society into the Party machine, the PRI shaped the
diverging interests into a plurality in within the party. The appointment of these
institutions’ officials by PRI officials, rather than election by the sectors which they
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represented, was the lynchpin that guaranteed the cooperation of the institutions with the
Party’s agenda and with that, the stability of the system.12
The hierarchical nature and dependence on party appointment of officials of the
CNC and CTM created not a quasi-checks and balances system, but rather a system by
which the state and the party could control and subdue society. The party limited the
voice options in a manageable way, still apparently tolerable enough for would-be
defectors to remain within the system. In contrast, the “popular” or landed middle class
sector’s designated institution, the CNOP, retained far more autonomy from party
control, thereby granting greater opportunities for asserting its interests with the ruling
coalition. This opportunistic voice option allowed that if opponents worked within the
system, it was possible for their discontent to be heard and dealt with, if only minimally.
Through these mechanisms for mandatory and controlled participation, the PRI directed
would-be dissenters away from an exiting of the system

The Downfall
The fall of the PRI was brought about by a combination of societal changes,
economic and international pressures. In consideration of the above analysis of the PRI’s
strengths, what changed between the early 1960s, when the PRI was still making a public
effort to undermine the influence and presence of the opposition, and 1996 to finally
bring about the delayed transition to democracy?

“Leaders of the less privileged groups are tied more to the regime, less to their
constituencies.” See, Levy, Daniel, and Gabriel Székely. Mexico: Paradoxes of Stability
and Change. 2nd ed. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987. 124. Print.
12
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The most important causes resulting in the downfall of the PRI were related to the
deteriorating relevance, effectiveness and success of the factors previously relied on for
incorporating labor and the poor and the slow and steady downfall of the Mexican
Economic Miracle. Two events in the last fifty years contributed extensively to the
breakdown: i) the student and labor grievances and violent state reaction involved in the
1968 uprisings, and ii) the 1985 earthquake. Furthermore the combined economic and
political crises and tensions that arose during the 1980’s and 1990’s sparked an urgent
impetus for change necessary to mobilize the country to pressure the regime for reforms.
Beyond the grievances of the students and their allies protesting government
policies surrounding the 1968 student uprisings, the reaction by the regime in both the
implementation of the use of force and the policies in the wake of the cover-up provide
insight into the downfall of the PRI. The decision to revert to the use of violence
represented an overestimation of party support and consolidation. That the uprisings
reached the level of public involvement that they did, highlights the existence of the
initial cracks to the PRI machine that had so long relied on methods of cooptation,
conciliation and coercion.
The PRI’s failure in 1968 with regards to the grievances of the students and their
allies was its unwillingness to make concessions that in the past it had been willing to
extend to ensure it would retain the support of society. This episode showed that the PRI
had become overconfident in its strength to risk such an overt use of repression. Luckily
for the PRI, it took some years following this incident, along with increased economic
pressures, for the opposition to gain enough strength to assert their power against the PRI.
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The economic downfall of Mexico in the later part of the 20th century represented
a central cause that led to the defection from the party to the opposition and the
consequential rationalization for the PRI to take on a self-orchestrated transition from
hegemonic rule to a competitive multi-party system.
The drawn-out decline of the economic miracle of Mexico, evidenced in the
accumulation of debt and extensive peso devaluations, revolve around the overall
weaknesses of Mexico’s version of the popular import substitution industrialization
economic strategy and its participation in an IMF led structural adjustment program.13
The repeated de-valuation of the peso coupled with expansive foreign-designed austerity
packages served as a metaphorical flashing neon sign evidencing the total failure of PRI
economic policies that had so long promised progress and trickle down capitalist
development. The necessity of foreign financial intervention was the bitter icing on the
cake.
The strategies of PRI administrations in regard to the opposition in the 1970’s and
1980’s, particularly the de la Madrid administration, coupled with the economic
strategies of the time ended up back firing on the Party. While the reform of 1986 was
meant to stimulate the opposition enough to bolster the legitimacy of the PRI, in the end
the stimulation was more than the Party had bargained for.14 The PAN’s victories in the
1985 and 86 elections at the state and local levels prompted the PRI to revert to using
such techniques as missing ballot boxes, duplication of registered voters, counting votes
13

As students of economic development history know, the execution of ISI throughout
Latin America during this era ended in exorbitant spending necessitating loans that
countries would never pay off, investment in industries that would largely never become
economically competitive and required extensive subsidies for inefficient industrial
sectors.
14
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of citizens who had not voted, and late-minute changes in the location of polling booths.15
The scope of fraud in the reaction by the PRI at this time marked the defection of leftwing Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas.
International tolerance of non-democratic regimes had shifted towards the end of
the 20th century to international pressure for democratic reforms, especially from the
U.S.. The international press coverage of presidential elections that built during the
1990’s provided an external check on the legitimacy of the electoral process. The
increasing interconnectedness of the U.S. and Mexico was a major source for this
pressure. While the negotiations and signing of NAFTA in 1994 seems like the most
obvious example of this pressure, the U.S. involvement in international financial
institutions resulted in a heavy American influence responding to Mexico’s economic
crises of the 1980s. Furthermore, the increasing pressure of Mexican immigration to the
U.S. necessitated increased interest of the U.S. for a more democratic state as well as
continued stability for its third largest trade partner.
The weakness of the regime that led to the deterioration of the state apparatus and
state effectiveness in dealing with crises is clearly evident in the state response to the
earthquake in 1985. The government’s inadequacies were highlighted in the failed
response to save persons trapped in the rubble in comparison to the heroic neighborhood
volunteers’ efforts in the wake of the quake.16
Throughout the strongest years of PRI hegemony, part of the strength of its
longevity was thanks to its turnover of career politicians and inclusion of elites within the
system but also it evolution of political recruitment. The regimes’ inability to continue to
15
16
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adapt to the needs and interests of an evolving society contributed in part to its downfall.
It seems that the most recent shift towards a new highly educated, tightknit politicaltechnical elite actually weakened the regime’s capacity to relate to its traditionally broad
support base.17 The shifts moved towards more business-administrative educated elites
within the political recruitment of the regime.18 While in no way reflecting a less
educated political bureaucracy, the rise of the political-technocrat created a lack of party
experience and with that, a decreasing ability for political bargaining skills of the party
bureaucratic apparatus while being more receptive to political and economic strategies
used abroad and less of those used in the traditional corporatist structure of the PRI.19
The state underwent a deeper, fundamental change through a number of shifts
within private sector-state relations. The fracturing of the longtime state and private
sector alliance and increased voluntary associations among multisectoral business leaders
left the post-PRI system without the corporatist structure it had traditionally relied on for
relations with the private sector, weakening the state in the face of an increasingly well
organized private sector.20 These new power dynamics, coupled by the parallel collapse
of the corporatist structure previously relied on between the State and the CTM and the
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Ben Ross Schneider argues that three systemic shifts during the downfall of the PRI
has lead to an increasingly well organized voluntary encompassing associations within
big business, such as the elusive and powerful CMHN (Consejo Mexicano de Hombres
de Negocios). The primary factors for this include (1) PRI exclusion of business from
elections and official appointment, (2) government actions that occasionally appeared
threatening to the interests of Mexican business and (3) periodic government reliance on
these associations to mediate relations with business in the face of the deterioration of
corporatist relations with business. See, Schneider, Ben Ross. "Why is Mexican Business
so Organized?" Latin America Research Review. 37.1 (2002): 77-118. Web. 10 Apr.
2012.
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CNC, created a highly unequal power relations between the wealthy haves and the less
organized, less autonomous have-nots as the state entered democratization.

The Transition
The faltering hegemonic Party, out of touch with society, carried out reforms
culminating in the transition to a competitive system. However these reforms did not
have the foresight necessary to implement lasting and systemic change. Much needed
were parallel institutional reforms outside of electoral institution reforms and the highly
biased and largely unmonitored structural adjustment programs. As recent developments
since the official transition to a democratic system in 2000 have proved, the military,
police and bureaucratic apparatus of the state remain ancient and ineffective. Mexico’s
transition to a competitive system was detrimentally impacted by the weaknesses of the
state system that the PRI had built coupled by the incompatibility of its corporatist
institutions. What is important to note about the PRI’s unique self-initiated transition to
democracy is that the change was a direct result of the strategic policy and choices of the
once hegemonic party. And further, that the main opposition parties, which by then had
gained unprecedented strength, chose to remain in the system and wait out the slow
tedious and non-linear reforms to allow for their full involvement and eventual success as
competitive parties.
The non-linear characterization of the reform period between 1977 and the final
reform of 1996 underlines both a lack of consensus within the party as well as the
ongoing fear within the party of the dangers associated with opening to a more
competitive system. Clearly, the assumptions made by non-democratic regimes that
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plurality necessarily means a lack of consensus and a lack of consensus necessarily
results in political disorder was an ongoing assumption within the mindsets of the PRI
prior to the reform period.21 In the founding years of the PRI incorporation of the masses
was key in establishing its rule. At the height of PRI reign and into its downfall, the
increasing reliance on electoral fraud is evidence perhaps less of over-confidence of the
regime but rather of the fear of the dangers associated with an open, competitive system.

What changed between 1961 and 1996 that finally justified the transition to democracy?
Drawing on Robert Dahls’ axioms regarding the importance of the costs and
benefits toleration and oppression, Beatriz Magaloni concludes that the PRI relinquished
its control over the election process to an independent IFE for two reasons: 1) It
calculated that it still had a good chance of winning elections cleanly, and 2) It
recognized that the opposition was in a stronger position than in the past to mount a
serious challenge if the PRI did not relinquish control over the IFE.22 By handing over
control of the IFE, the PRI effectively ‘tied its hands’ not to commit fraud, which
represented a major step towards democratization for the regime.23 The traditional
clientelist methods of representation had indeed become more costly and more difficult as
the middle class grew and business became more organized. Outside pressure, associated
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with the costs of suppression, in this sense was a leading factor prompting the PRI’s selfinitiated reforms.
Mexico scholar, Roderic Camp, differs from Magaloni in emphasizing a different
rationale for initiating reforms. He posits instead that the PRI established the various
electoral reforms as a way of stimulating the opposition with the goal of cleaning the PRI
and its image as perceived by the general populous.24
A maxim by Giovanni Sartori contributes another important perspective that
could apply to the PRI’s decision to implement electoral reform,
“Pluralism develops often as a result of religious, political or class-based
disconnections whereby the stakes of political controversy are so high so
as to justify the surrendering of power within a competitive party system.25
This maxim applies most closely to the high tense political controversy that
existed in 1994 and 1995 as a result of the uprising in Chiapas and the controversy over
the introduction of NAFTA. These crises culminated in the ultimate and absolute reform
granting independence to the IFE in 1996, representing the final unlocking of the PRI
system that had previously barred the victory of any non-party candidate from
Presidential office.
Though over-confidence of the PRI in its continued predominance in the system is
palpable, and the reform-based PR campaign remains empirically valid, it was the
fundamental shifts within the Party itself, I would argue, that encompasses a deeper
reasoning behind the electoral reforms. From a big history perspective it was the Party’s
continued success and stability in providing minimal economic progress and minimal
24
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public services, such as the adjudication of labor and peasant disputes with organized
business, and the efficacy and effectiveness by which these missions were guaranteed,
that most contributed to the legitimacy of the PRI’s hegemonic rule. With the economic
failures, the increasing irrelevance and deterioration of the corporatist structure
previously relied on, the Party, at this time was faced with a serious legitimacy crisis.
This legitimacy crisis prompted a game-changing decision with the PRI ruling
party. The political-technical elite, largely educated in the United States, recognized the
urgency of this crisis and the vital necessity for systemic reforms. Much as the CardenasCalles ideological battle in 1940 ended in the decision by Calles to bow to the
progressive agenda of Cardenas in return for the stability of the system in which he made
his life’s work, the climatic decision by the PRI between 1988 and 1996 to bow to
electoral reforms reflected the priority of the party to see the stability of the system it had
created rather than allow the total exiting of the opposition and deterioration of the state.
Evidenced by the non-linear development and response to the reforms, the remaining
ruling coalition within the PRI was not in a consensus in regard to this. Mexico’s
transition to democracy was thus prompted by outside pressure on an aging hegemonic
system and the mature, realistic decision by its ruling elite to bet for the first time on
Mexico rather than on itself.

Before moving on to the final concluding analysis of the puzzle being explored in
this thesis, it is important to return for a moment to the conditions of the Mexican state
today and the questions that surround the current crises involving the drug cartel war. In
consideration of the claim by some analysts in 2008 and 2009 that Mexico could be
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headed toward a failed state status, do the security challenges that have arisen since the
first democratically elected opposition candidate in 2000 signify evidence that transitions
to democracy necessarily result or often result in a fall in state stability and rise of state
vulnerability?
In order to answer this question, I will compare the crisis of legitimacy faced by
the state in 1994 with that of today. The security challenge of the drug cartels questions
the legitimacy no longer of a specific party but that of the state. This represents a greater
challenge to state stability than a related challenge of legitimacy that the PRI as a party
faced in 1994 with the Chiapas rebellion. While the Chiapas uprising represented a
serious threat to the stability of the state in its rightful challenge to the institutional
legitimacy of the PRI as a party, the situation today is substantially graver. The Chiapas
uprising and overall questioning of the legitimacy of the PRI was appeased somewhat
easily with the 1994 and 1996 reforms to the electoral institutions. Today, in contrast, is
much less of a quick fix. Whereas the societal pressure that existed in the 1990s for
institutional reform targeted the transition to democratic rule, the present situation cannot
be so easily identified. The challenges inherent in the war on cartel eradication represent
flaws in the state structure of the newly democratic state system. It is a matter of
institutional legitimacy of the electoral process specifically versus a deficit of legitimacy
across the board.
The general ineffectiveness and lack of efficacy of the newly consolidated
democracy highlights the weaknesses of the nascent competitive system. The recent rise
of the PAN and the PRD has been slow to fill the gaps of incorporation of the broad
sectors of society previously incorporated by the PRI corporatist structure. It is by
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unlucky happenstance that the final transition to a competitive system has coincided with
the proliferation of an international security challenge surrounding the drug cartel war.
The system is ill-equipped today both with the downfall of the PRI apparatus and the
inexperience in governance of the new party to handle such an all encompassing security
challenge that is heavily dependent on the lawful, structured, efficient and effective
response of a wide range of bureaucracies and institutions.
The greatest challenges to Mexico today remain closely linked to the security
challenges surrounding the drug war and the institutional strength that the state must
build in order to face these challenges.26 The greatest weaknesses of the State correspond
to its greatest challenges for the future, representing an important feedback loop. They
include: (1) Surmounting the drug violence and maintaining security within and without
Mexico’s borders, (2) building strong, new, autonomous and effective institutions that
can withstand the various pressures and challenges of the young struggling democracy,
(3) maintaining the ability to keep its citizens secure and exercise its authority over its
sovereign territories and (4), creating trust in its institutions. Without trust in the
institutions, surmounting the drug violence is impossible, and without strong and
effective institutions, the state cannot hope to keep its citizens secure and maintain a
monopoly of force within its sovereign territories.
As regards the future of a one party rule for Mexico, many scholars have cited the
2000 election as the end-all of Mexico’s one-party rule. However certain events provide
26
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evidence to the contrary. For one, there has been a resurgence of PRI support—only 12
years—two sexenios-- after the foundation of democracy was established in 2000. In fact,
the current head of the Federal District, a member of the PRI, has long been pegged as
the favored candidate for the upcoming 2012 elections.27 Second, the assumption that the
PRI was the only threat to democracy is not well founded. The 2006 election of Felipe
Calderon of the PAN has been disputed with claims of election irregularities and voter
fraud.28 The 2000 victory of the PAN does not represent the permanent creation of a
stable multi-party competitive system. And, as this summer’s presidential election is
likely to prove, a return to PRI hegemony is likely even after the twelve years of PAN
presence in Los Pinos.
I would suggest two possible interpretations of this return to power of the PRI: It
could signal that the seeming failure of the PAN to maintain security has forced the
Mexican people to welcome to office a president under whose party state and human
security was last guaranteed. Second, it could indicate that a PRI victory will not come as
a result of the strength of the PRI but rather as a result of the weakness of the opposition
parties in the wake of the PRI system.
The PRI party organization has been able to take advantage of these phenomena
to re-establish its strength. What the significance of this resurgence will mean for the
democratic process will soon be seen, and that will depend in part on the methods that are
used to implement its new party policies.
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Conclusions about how one-party systems can impact the stabilitydevelopment tradeoff
Even with the above recognition that Mexico’s security challenges probably do
not signify a parallel fall in state stability in all transitions to democracy from one-party
rule, its experience does provide important insights to the stability-development tradeoff.
The development of a state and the interrelated development of a democratic system
within that state are processes replete with challenges and forces working against their
consolidation. The development of a one-party system, as we have seen in the case of
Mexico, can result in the deterrence or even extended postponement of the transition to a
competitive democratic system. A successfully stable and tightly controlled one-party
system such as the PRI can both retard the rise of opposition parties and result in the
cooptation of would-be opponents of the system through creating a loyal opposition.
Furthermore, upon transitioning to a democratic system the opposition, previously
coopted by the hegemonic system, may have lingering deficiencies, such as the case of
the PAN. Since the strength of a hegemonic system often relies on such tools such as
clientalistm, corporatist institutions, corruption and outright bribery for the functioning of
its institutions, the transition to democracy can leave the relative strength of the state in a
precarious position, depending on the particular route to democracy that it takes.
As we know from literature on plurality and party systems, the development of
party systems occur in part as a way of making the government responsible to its citizens.
The particular structure and legitimacy surrounding the PRI machine can contribute
important insight into Sartori’s elaboration that intra-party competition cannot replace
inter-party competition characteristic of multi-party democracies and the responsiveness
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expected of inter- versus intra-party competition. In the case of the PRI, tolerance of
minimal intra-party competition and plurality within the party was a major factor in the
stability, longevity and even legitimacy of the regime. Legitimacy was achieved due to
the regime’s relatively high tolerance for the opposition in exchange for the loyalty of
that opposition. However, as the state develops and its institutions become more complex
in their provision of public goods for society, stable intra-party competition cannot be
sustained. One of the most impressive accomplishments of the PRI was its ability to
sustain its relative cohesiveness in the face of such broad intra-party plurality. Further,
the encouragement of the broad spectrums within the party for such an extended period in
effect stunted the development of opposition parties capable of governing.
The party cohesiveness and stability in the case of Mexico, was maintained
through its broad corporatist structure. What is interesting about the downfall of this
system and the weakness of the state that remained in the vacuum left by the PRI was its
connection with the unique form of legitimacy in its corporatist structure. As Sartori
elaborates, state responsiveness develops as a result of the institutions it creates.29 His
model for the development of party pluralism differs from the route to party pluralism
that has developed in Mexico. The model reflects the development of the state from
constitutional pluralism to responsive government whereby the state is responsible first to
its ministers and parliament and then to the state institutions that develop. In the case of
Mexico, the PRI was never fully responsible to parliamentary institutions or any
institution involving the electoral process at all. Rather, it made itself responsible to the
extra-state institutions it had created itself for the cooptation of broad sectors of society.
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In this sense the party system developed responsibility—and with that, legitimacy— not
through formal state institutions, but rather through extra-state institutions that allowed
for greater control and flexibility on the part of the ruling coalition.
The frustration and near total lack of hope within Mexican society in the face of
today’s security challenges is a result of the diminished legitimacy of the state due to the
vacuum left in the wake of the PRI. While the PRI retained a high degree of strength at
its height, fundamental deficiencies lurked just below the surface that would cripple the
state remaining in the wake of its downfall. The PRI’s corporatist structure relied on
unsustainable corporatist institutions that were built not to strengthen the state but rather
to strengthen the party. The state that the PRI’s hegemonic system had created has
ceased to exist, and with it the stability of the state and the legitimacy of its institutions.
In this sense, the consolidation of a state under a hegemonic one-party system can
lead to fundamental challenges for state stability and legitimacy as that system transitions
to an open, competitive system. As the case of Mexico exhibited, the challenges can arise
when the opposition gains strength yet the institutional system under which the previous
regime operated is no longer relevant. If the transition process does not include broad,
system reforms, beyond the electoral process, by which to strengthen the bureaucratic
capacity of the state outside of the usual tools of non-democratic regimes such as
corporatism and corruption, the state is left in a very vulnerable position. If, as in the case
of Mexico, new, urgent crises emerge following a democratic transition by which an
efficient and effective state response is required, and the state has not properly prepared
itself institutionally, a fall in state legitimacy and stability may result. Furthermore a fall
in legitimacy can lead to the opportunity for state failure. Another possible response to
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such a situation, as this summer’s Presidential elections in Mexico may prove, would be a
reverting to a closed, though stable and controlled system in an effort to reestablish a
strong, effective state system.

Conclusions about how party systems and transitions to democracy as a
whole can impact the tradeoff
The paradox of Mexico’s exceptionally smooth transition to democracy was the
fall in legitimacy of the state since its transition.30 It is commonly assumed that a
transition to a more democratic system generally coincides with a higher propensity for
legitimacy of the state. In the case of Mexico today, the new legitimacy of its democratic
electoral process has been overshadowed by the fall in legitimacy of essentially all
remaining institutions. What can this phenomenon contribute, validate or disprove within
literature on state development, stability and legitimacy literature?
It is commonly known that ineffectiveness weakens the authority of the state,
which in turn weakens legitimacy of the government.31 Furthermore, it is well recorded
that public goods provided by a consolidated state are hierarchically ranked, with the
maintenance of state and human security ranked highest.32 The legitimacy of the PRI was
maintained due to (1) the assurance of minimal public services, (2) relatively dependable
economic progress and (3) the effectiveness by which policies were implemented and
disputes were adjudicated—however outside the realm of democratic norms the
implementation was carried out. The latter of these assurances, the effectiveness of the
30
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PRI, represents the crux of the reason for the fall of legitimacy since the downfall of the
PRI. It was only after the opposition came to power that it became evident that the long
decline of the PRI had coincided with the long decline of state strength. More to the
point, it was the decline of state effectiveness that has created the fall in legitimacy of the
state in the eyes of society. State stability, intricately connected to legitimacy, is now at
risk. It is not because the transition to democracy is inherently destabilizing, but rather
that the transition to democracy from a state system built upon the extra-legal practices of
a hegemonic party system creates conditions that can lead to state failure. This analysis
necessitates an elaboration on a number of prescriptive requirements:
The democratization process from authoritarian systems can have destabilizing
impacts on the stability of a state system if:
1.

The previous non-democratic regime relied on extra-legal or nonofficial means for implementing policy, adjudicating disputes,
negotiating with non-governmental organizations or regulating financial
institutions.

2.

The previous non-democratic regime stunted the growth of a multiparty system.

3.

The previous non-democratic regime existed under a party-system
which blurred the line between state and party apparatus

4.

The transition process does not include a thorough restructuring of state
institutions and the fostering of new state-society relations, either
through voluntary civil society associations, or formal institutions
meant to mediate relations transparently.
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Conclusion
As the case study of Mexico’s transition to democracy, and the challenges it
faces, following this transition shows, the democratization process is dependent on the
relative strength and development of the state for providing state, and especially human
security. And further that parties and party systems can be major influences in this
interdependence.
As we have seen, since 2000, the state has weakened in its assurance of effective
deliverance of the most essential public goods. The longtime dependence on extra-legal
and non-official bureaucratic structures that operated under a grey area of state-party
institutions has created an institutionally inept state structure incapable of delivering the
public services in the wake of the PRI’s downfall. The stability that was enjoyed under
the PRI’s presidential transitions and systemic strength that existed at the level of the
party ceased once another party took over.
The new democratic system is defenseless in the face of organized business today;
it is left with a weakened institutional base from which to handle security crises such as
the rising power of drug cartels—or earthquakes and other natural disasters.
Mexico’s continued preference for the privileged and continued provisions for the
security of their interests through the reforms of the last thirty years has guaranteed
enough stability by which to avoid the deep, institutional change that remains necessary
for the full transition to a competitive, open, multi-party democracy.
While the crisis and reform period of the 1990s and the first democratic election
in 2000 represented a turning point in Mexican political history, I would argue that the
coming decade will come to represent a more telling crossroad. In a similar manner in
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which Mexico’s reconstruction of the state following the Revolution necessitated a major
reassessment of Mexican statehood and conciliation of the classes, Mexico today must
reassess the values upon which its state system is based. And further, Mexico must
continue to protect its newly competitive system, avoiding a relapse into the tightly
controlled system of yesterday, while rebuilding the institutions that should be providing
state and human security.
Due to the current situation of state weakness, Mexico is in danger of relapsing to
a political system that ensures control and stability at the cost of liberty and plurality.
“The overwhelming dominance of definitions based on the largely
unrecognized assumption that uniformity is desirable has led the historical
literature to confuse the needful thing, unity, with the harmful thing,
uniformity. But, Luis González asks, in what way does recognition of the
legitimacy of the thousands of matrias that make up the patria threaten the
whole? Does recognition of heterogeneity endanger the survival of the
nation? I believe not. I believe it constitutes a necessary awareness of the
multiplicity of the mosaic without which the whole is weakened rather than
strengthened. If modern Mexico faces a crisis of definition, perhaps some
of its definitions have been false.”33
In consideration of the mounting threats to state stability and the weakness of its
nascent democracy, this emphasis of the need for uniformity strikes a new chord in the
Mexico of today. The fears of disunity, dissent and discontent must be embraced in order

33
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to deepen the institutionalization of plurality in governance and not as dangers to the
stability of the system.
Due to the rising position of Mexico within the world’s political economy, its
position relative to the U.S. and to the rest of Lain America, the future of Mexican state
stability and democracy should be a central concern to the U.S. and the rest of the world
arena. Furthermore, its experience should inform the future transitions of states
throughout the developing world. The democratization process, particularly electoral
democratization, must only be undertaken with a clear understanding of both the ongoing
and the new challenges to state stability that can develop in a transitioning from a nondemocratic system to an open, competitive democracy.
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CISLA Addendum
Toor Cummings Center for International Studi es and the Liberal Arts
Senior Integrative Project
Guiding Questions
What are the origins and dynamics of contemporary society?
What is the relevance of the past in understanding the present and the possibilities for the
future?
What are the material, spiritual, and ethical challenges of modernity?
Critics of the worldwide trend towards global integration, known as
‘globalization’ often criticize the negative impact the phenomenon is having in causing
the decline of traditional societies, ancient traditions and languages in favor of a more
materialistic, “Westernized” society. While there may be a relative decline of the
prevalence of more traditional cultures in some parts of the world, there are many
instances of the past continuing to play an important role in some societies within an
increasingly globalized context. Mexico is one such case where the struggles and themes
of the past continue to impact reality today and the challenges of its progress pose new
questions about its progress.
The ethical challenges of modernity today revolve around the issue of inequality
and the growing gap that exists both within deeply unequal societies and between the
developed North and the ongoing underdevelopment of the global South. While Mexico,
like many developing countries, has made huge strides towards the industrialized,
globalized ‘modern’ society as we measure it today, the underlying inequality represents
not only a blemish on the image of progress for Mexico but it also poses the larger
question of at what cost progress and modernity comes.
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Mexico counts today as one of the most unequal economies in the world. The
immense wealth and modern infrastructure that is found in the Distrito Federal and the
increasingly wealthy cities to the North such as Monterrey stand in stark contrast to the
rural areas just hours outside of city limits. The economic status of the majority of lower
and middle economic groups of Mexico, counting fully 36% living at the poverty line and
13% in extreme poverty, contrast sharply with Mexico’s own Carlos Slim Helu,
telecommunication giant and currently the richest man in the world worth more than $62
billion.1
The contemporary notion of modernity today largely revolves around the concept
of political and economic development. As this thesis has made clear, these two trends
are neither inevitable nor irreversible. Furthermore the trend toward economic progress
come at a high cost, and presents many ethical challenges. At both the global and national
level, recent studies have emerged highlighting the growing costs of progress. The costs
range from environmental degradation to the increase and continued violations of human
rights and inequality. In many cases, including Mexico and even the United States,
economic progress has outpaced political progress, and it has come at the cost of skyrocketing inequality.
Recent studies have begun to shed light on the ethical and material impact that
such unchecked economic growth has had throughout the world. At the global level, an
analysis depicting the relationship between 43,000 transnational corporations has
identified a relatively small group of companies, mostly banks, who control a

1

"Wiki Driven Corporate Transparency Latin America." Start Some Good, n.d. Web. 2
May 2012.
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disproportionate amount of the global economy.2 The specific findings of this report
reveal a shocking statistic that 147 transnational corporations (TNCs) control 40% of the
world’s wealth.3 Independent organizations in Mexico have found a similar trend
whereby 38 men in Mexico control a full 27% of the Mexican economy.4 The core
findings of each of these research projects are based on the fact that large corporations
are owned and directed by individuals connected to a high number of other companies
and that those companies themselves often have direct ties to other companies. Such
trends of corporate interlocking networks, at both the national and international levels
depict perhaps one of the most complex and dangerous consequences of concentrated and
unchecked economic growth.
At the very core, globalization is the growing interconnectivity of the global
community. Yet interestingly, the challenges of growing interconnectivity have been
apparent throughout world history.
Today’s globalized world is largely a product of big historical trends, of dynamics
of the past as well as new dynamics that continue to be introduced every day. When
considering the history of the world, globalization has been the product of a great
historical trend. Many globalization scholars cite three main waves of globalization. Each
of these waves reveals key new dynamics of technology and increased global
communications. With each new innovation in technology, new challenges have emerged
with the loss of old traditions in everything from the distribution of labor and resources to
societal beliefs on religion.
2
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The first wave of globalization essentially took place in Mexico, and in the “New
World” in general. The conquest of Mexico and the merging of cultures that followed
marked a crucial transition from the pre-Columbian to the modern world. It is exceptional
to history because it is arguably one of the only convergences of two distinctly different
civilizations.
Since this first wave of globalization, Mexico has been highly impacted by the
ongoing theme of the new role of the ‘other’ in society. The Aztec and Mayan societies
were highly hierarchical in their class system. However it was not until the conquest by
the Spanish that this sentiment of ‘otherness’ gained a racial component.
Mexico’s development, which was slow until the turn of the twentieth century, as
a society and a state, coincided with the other two waves of globalization. The building of
the Mexican state and the consolidation of the elite had coincided in time with the
blossoming of the second wave of globalization during the Industrial Revolution of the
United States and Western Europe. However, at each wave of globalization, the interests
of those in power have systematically and consistently repressed the needs and desires of
the have-nots of Mexico.
Since the third wave of development that is said to have begun following the
Second World War, Mexico has represented an important rising star in the globalized
world order. Mexico’s hegemonic PRI party sought to insert the country into the new
globalizing world for its own benefit. Later in the century Mexico saw important reforms
in the opening up of its longtime hegemonic one-party rule in the 1970’s and continued
long-term economic growth despite a number of economic crises.

137

In 1994 and 1995 Mexico entered into a major trade partnership with the U.S. and
Canada through the North American Free Trade Agreement. This trade agreement
symbolizes many of the successes of globalization and, importantly, many of its
deficiencies. NAFTA, from a Mexican standpoint, has not contributed to the kind of
economic development and growth that was promised during the intense debate and push
by U.S. diplomats prior to the agreement. Surrounding this agreement is the issue of
exportation of production by U.S. companies in search of lower cost labor production, the
biggest example of this being the maquiladora assembly plants that sprung up along the
Mexican Border States at this time. Characterized by low wages and long hours, this
industrial development increased interconnectedness of Mexico on the regional level
during the latest wave of globalization and has led to further ‘othering’ within sectors of
its society.
The issue of ‘otherness’ for Mexico within today’s globalized world surrounds the
challenges inherent in being a developing country from the Global South, and in
particular within Latin America. The development of Mexico has been both
overshadowed by its neighbor to the North in the issues depicted above, and at the same
time it has faced an identity crisis—torn between identifying itself with the rest of Latin
America and continuing to identify itself with the U.S.
So where does this leave the prospects for Mexico in today’s globalizing world?
Development efforts of the state are making major strides towards greater inclusion of
historically marginalized groups, towards greater equality through wealth distribution
programs such as Oportunidades and even towards a more sovereign and powerful
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position within the world arena (Mexico takes over the leadership position of the G20 this
year).5
Mexico is in many ways the product of globalization as well as its own rich and
diverse history. It is clear that the dilemmas and challenges of the past—of otherness and
of inequality, of subjugation and marginalization—continue to be present in today’s
increasingly globalized Mexican society.
The challenge of inequality has deep roots in Mexican history but scholars like
Jorge Casteñeda and Aguilar Camín depict a hopeful future for this turning point for
Mexico.
“Mexico is a prisoner of its History. Inherited ideas, sentiments and
interests keep Mexico from swiftly moving to the pace yearned for by its
citizens. The history that has been logged in our national psyche—in its
laws, its institutions, its habits and fantasies—obstructs the country’s
future trajectory. It has been famously observed that politicians are held
hostage by dead economists. Similarly, public life in Mexico is held
hostage by the decisions of its dead Presidents, by the political inheritance
of statism and corporatism that we call “revolutionary nationalism” and is
sheltered by the mythical acronym—PRI—that today is both a minority
party and the reigning political culture… Something greater is needed to
pull the country out of its existential and political stagnation. A new
national epic is needed whose axis cannot be separated from the welfare of
the majority, the promise of employment, health, social mobility and
5
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security—a horizon of modernity that contemplates the rise of a solid
middle class that includes a majority of the people. What is required is an
epic of prosperity, democracy and equality that, as of now, is not clearly
outlined anywhere.”6
These sentiments on the current challenges to Mexico’s political and economic
development can easily be applied to the challenges of progress at the global level.
The world is progressing. We are progressing towards an ever-evolving image of
what the future holds. These ideas are propagated not only by the best, and the brightest
but also the wealthiest and the most powerful. “Progress,” by definition, suggests itself to
be a good thing. History tells us how far we have come and science tells us how far we
can go. But our moral ground needs to be given a reality check in order stay on track with
true universal progress and away from a progress for the few and stagnation for the rest.
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